Tapol bulletin no, 74, March 1986 by unknown
British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 74 Morch 1986 
Buyung Nasution stripped of his 
right to practice? 
The Indonesian juditiary has intensified its attack on 
the country's human rights lawyers by moving to 
suspending the licence to practice · of Adrian Buyung 
Nasution becdC:ise of his powerful challenge to the court 
during the trial of retired Gen. H.R. Dharsono. Buyung's 
defence particularly angered the regime because he tried 
to expose the real cause of the 12 September 1984 Tanjung 
Priok demonstration, which troops fired on, killing 
dozens of -people and wounding hundreds more. 
The Dhorsono trial ended on 8 January with a verdict of 
ten years. As the verdict was being read out, Buyung, 
the chief of Dharsono's team of lawyers, rose to protest 
when the verdict .. accused the defence of "improper and 
unethical behaviour". The verdict accused the defence of 
"drawing the conclusion that the government had inflamed 
the situation [mematangkan situasi1 ~ implying that the 
Tanjung Priok incident had been planned in advance. It 
appears that the defence team was premature in drawing 
such a conclusion without adequate proof. Their 
conclusion is extremely dangerous because it can cause 
the people to have a bad image of the government. This 
is both in-proper and unethical". 
When Buyung rose _ to protest, he repeated his demand, 
made on ci· number of occasions during the trial, that the 
North Jakarta chief-~f-police, lsmet, should be coiled to 
testify. This electrified the atmosphere in the court-
roCITl, and o policeman on guard outside entered. Buyung 
immediately turned on the policeman, saying: 'This court-
room is under the authority of the judge, not the police, 
so get out!" The policeman immediately withdrew. 
The incident. led a month -loter to Buyung being charged 
with contempt of court. Following this, the chairman of 
the Jakarta District Court issued an administrative 
decision to suspend BuyuAg's licence to practice. The 
final decision rests with the Minister of Justice. · Buyung 
has one month in which to appeal. The Court is acting 
under new, unprecedented powers vested in the courts, 
authorising them to control and- suspend lawyers. 
Buyung's challenge to the Murdani version of Tanjung 
Pride 
A long interview of Buyung in De Volkslcrant on 28 March 
reveals that the real issue at stoke was not the court 
incident on 8 January. The real issue was the defence 
team's determined attempt to call the North Jakarta 
Chief-of-Police, lsmet to testify. There is strong reason 
to believe, said Buyung, that well before the 
.. demonstration, -lsmet advised the army on the need to 
prevent any demonstration taking place, warning them that 
the situation in the region was very explosive. 
Buyung Nasution 
protesting In court on 
the final day of the 
Dharsono trial. [Tentpo, 
18 January 1986] 
Unfortunately, his advice was ignored, with terrible 
consequences. (To have presented such evidence would have 
profoundly undermined General Murdani 's version of the 
incident as a deliberate and planned attack on the army 
and the police.) 
Twice during the trial, lsmel was due to appear but 
each time he failed to turn up. Before the third attempt 
to hear his evidence, Buyung says/ the chairman of the 
court, Sudijono, approached him privately, pleading with 
him not to press the court further on the matter. The 
question of lsmet's testimony had placed the court in an 
impossible position, he said, and in any case, lsmet had 
been tranferred to North Sumatra. (Immediately after the 
end of the- trial, Sudijono was also transferred, so the 
task of taking action against Buyung has fallen to his 
successor, Subandi.) 
Buyung also told the press that his defence team had 
become extremely suspicious of the government's position 
when attempts to call two other witnesses, Syari f Maloko 
and Nasir, also failed. The two men had delivered fiery 
speeches just before the Tanjung Priok demonstration, but 
both had since mysteriously disappeared. If Dharsono can 
be tried for subversion, why haven't these two men been 
charged? This question had strengthened our suspicion, 
said Buyung, that the Tonjung Priok incident was a 
provocation, instigated by the authorities, and that 
these two men hod acted on instructions from the 
authorities, to inflame passions in Tanjung Priok. 
Ali Sodikin on the need to oppose Suharto 
The same issue of De Volkskront also quoted from an 
interview with Ali Sadikin, a leading figure in the 
Petition-of-50 group, declaring that he is not afraid to 
speak out openly against the Suharto government. He 
revealed that hardly any.one, even their relatives, now 
dared visit Fatwa and Dharsono, both serving long terms 
of imprisonment for subversion. Ali Sodikin himself 
visits both men in Salemba Prison. 
He told De Volkshant how shocked he was during a 
recent visit to see fifty youngsters being brought in for 
theft. They are not hardened criminals, he said, but 
youngsters forced by worsening economic conditions to 
resort to er ime. He also warned of the effects of the 
decline in petroleum prices on the level of poverty in 
Indonesia. 
Contempt of court law in preparation 
Immediately following the contempt charges against 
Buyung, it was announced that a law on contempt of court 
is in preparation. Such a law is clearly intended. to curb 
defence lawyers as well as media reporting of tria~s. The 
chairman of the Jakarta district court, Soeband1, who 
initiated the contempt action against Buyung, said t~is 
low is neede"d "because some people hove been doing 
everything possible to degrade the prestige of the 
court." He also accused. ,the press of creating the 
impression that courts ad unfairly .. [Ja<orto Post, 11 
March] 
The legal profession hos reacted strorigly . to the 
proposed low. The effect would be to reinforce the powers 
of the judiciary while undermining even further the 
status of defendants, their lawyers, witnesses and 
spectators. Director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute 
(LBH), Abdul Hakim G. Nusantara said such a law c?ula 
only be justified if it also enabled contempt actions 
against prosecutors and judges. 
Lawyers have been quick to point out that the sudden 
interest in a law on contempt of court is a reaction to 
the recent subversion trials. 'We should avoid giving the 
courts executive powers," said Puma.di Purbacaraka at an 
LBH panel discussion. Yap Thiam Hien believes the new 
initiative was prompted by recent clashes between lawyers 
and judges. Anwar Haryono sees the new low as a reaction 
to developments during the current subversion trials. 
lKompos, 21 March] 
E. Java lawyer refuses to register 
A criminal trial was adjourned in Surabaya when the judge 
refused to proceed because the defending lawyer had not 
registered at the court. The rule requiring lawyers to 
register and be subject to the court's supervision was 
introduced, against the opposition of the legal 
profession, early last year. 
Trimulya, who chairs the Boord of Honour of the East 
Java Bar Association [Peradin], repeated, despite 
pressure from the judge, that under no circumstances 
would he conform to the new regulation. 
Death-squad killings 
Death-squad killings continued 
throughout 1985, according to a press 
·release from the Legal Aid lnsHtute 
(LBH). The situation is most serious 
in East Java with 200-300 victims 
during the year. The LBH believes the 
total nationwide was around 600. In 
1983 and 1984, there were nearly 5,000 
victims. 
Most bodies are dumped by the 
roadside in a sack. They are riddled 
with bullets, with the hands and feet 
bound. According to the LBH, killers 
are paid 50,000 rupiahs (about £30) 
for each killing. [A FP, 25 March] 
The Institute· did not say who it 
thought was responsible for the 
''mystery killings". Para-commandos 
were known to be responsible in 1983-
4. In 1985, the police announced their 
own "shoot-to-kill" operation against 
"criminals". 
This photograph appeared in The .Ja1carta Times (11 March 1986]. The body, bent double, was discovered on a building site 
in East Jakarta. 
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THE TANJUNG PR/OK MASSACRE 
Testimony of a witness who 
was shot three times 
Two victirns of the army massacre at Tanjung Priok on 12 September 1984 appeared as witnesses at the trial of retired 
General H.R. Dharsono. We publish below the full transcripts of their testimony. One of these witnesses, Yusron, was 
tried in early 1985 together with 27 other victims. [For details of the Tanjung Priok massacre and the trial of the 28 
victims, see TAPOL Bulletin, No 68, March 1985, and 69, May 1985.] 
I am Yusron, son of Pak Zainuri, 19 years old, a 
school-pupil, living at Rawabinangun VII/1 Rt.010/08, 
Koja, North Jakarta. 
On 12 September 1984, I went to a friend's wedding in 
the afternoon. On my return home, I saw that many people 
had congregated on Jalan Sindang Raya for a pengaj.ian 
(religious rally). Because I like pengajian programmes, I 
looked for the loudspecker so as to be able to hear (the 
speeches). Unfortunately, it was not in front of the 
platform but on a gangway and the sound was often 
disjointed. 
People said that it was Amir Biki who was speaking. One 
of the things I heard him say was that four brothers had 
been arrested by Kodim (district military corrrnand). If 
they could not come and appear before this rally by 
eleven that night, Amir Biki urged us all to go in a 
crowd to Kodim and call for our brothers' release. As the 
loudspeaker was frequently inaudible and people were also 
incanting prayers out loud, I wasn't able to hear much 
else that Amir Biki said. But I do remember hearing him 
say that anyone who became disorderly would no longer be 
a brother. I then remembered that I hadn't said my night 
prayer so I went home which wasn't far from where I had 
been listening to the pengajian speeches. 
After saying my prayers, I felt left out. I wanted to 
know what would happen if the congregation went to Kodim 
to ask for the release of the four brothers they had 
arrested. So I left home and ran back, pushing my way to 
the front of the crowd. When we were nearing the Police 
headquarters in Jalan Yos Sudarso about 3 kms from the 
Kodim headquarters, the rows of people were already 
blocked by lines of soldiers in close formation, one 
moving fast, the next moving slowly, the next fast again, 
along the other side of Jalan Yos Sudarso. 
Because soldiers armed with automatic r i fies were 
blocking the way, the members of the congregation in 
charge prevented the crowd from pressing forward, using 
crossed bamboo sticks. Most of the people in the crowd 
sot down on the rood, incanting prayers. One fellow was 
doing a silat (self-defence) performance to hold the 
attention of the crowd. Then, four men from the crowd 
went to the front and approached the soldiers who 
appeared to be leading the troops. 
I couldn't hear what they said as they were quite a 
"Only much later did I realise that I 
had been hit by a bullet ••• 11 
distance from where I was standing and anyway, there was 
still the noise of the prayer incantations. Then, all of 
a sudden, the man in corrrnond of the troops shouted: "Get 
back!" The troops moved back and irrrnediately opened fire 
on the people. I turned round but fell down straight 
away. Only much later did I realise that I had been hit 
by a bullet from in front which hit me on the left side 
of my chest, and a bullet from behind which hit me in the 
waist and the left arm.· 
There were two hails of fire. The first occurred not 
long after the rows of people had come to a halt, Then, 
probably less than half an hour later there was another 
outburst of mass shooting. Apparently some people who had 
not been hit hod got up and run away. So even more people 
were shot down. 
As for me, I was still prostrate on the ground and I 
began to feel pain in those ports of my body where I had 
been hit, but I was still conscious. So I was able to 
hear the roar of army trucks arriving and see their 
headlamps. How could these trucks possibly drive along 
the rood when everywhere was full of bodies, of people 
lying face down or bodies that had been hit by bullets 
like mel As I was thinking about all this, I felt a kick 
and heard someone shout: ''This one is still alive!" 
followed by an order: ''Finish him off!" A shot was fired 
from close range, but it hit the ground just beside my 
ear. The noise was deafening and frightened me out of my 
wits. I remained conscious all this time though in my 
heart, I longed to lose consciousness. 
I don't know how long I lay there on the road, but then 
I felt my two hands and two legs being grabbed and I was 
swung up and thrown onto a truck. Luckily, I fell on top 
of a pile of bodies. I felt around me with my hands and 
111 felt with n1y hands that there were 
two human bodies beneath me .•• 11 
realised that there were two layers of human bodies 
beneath me. They were stiff, irrrnobile and had already 
gone cold. Twice I felt bodies being piled up on top of 
me. Could it be true that there were five layers of human 
bodies piled up in this army truck? While I was still 
trying to understand it all, the army truck started up, 
apparently because it was already full of bodies. 
When we arrived at a well-lit place - I realised later 
this was the Gatot Soebroto Army Hospital - they sorted 
us out, the deocl bodies from those who were still alive. 
I had still not lost consciousness; in fact, from where I 
was put down from the truck, I counted another three army 
trucks which hod arrived in convoy from Tonjung Priok. 
Were they all as full as the one that hod transported me? 
I was treated in the hospital for a month. All that 
time, I didn't receive a single visit from any member of 
my family. Weren't they missing me? This unanswered 
question caused me a great deal of pain. Only later on 
did I hear that they were not allowed to visit me. The 
same fate was suffered by the others together with me in 
the ward on the third floor of the hospital. At one time 
we numbered altogether 67 people. All were victims of the 
12 September 1984 Tanjung Priok incident. 
After my injuries began to heal, I was moved to the 
military detention centre in Cimanggis, together with my 
fellow sufferers. Then I was dragged before a court on a 
charge of CCXTTilitting violence against the security 
forces. I was found guilty and sentenced to one year in 
prison. 
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THE TANJUNG PR/OK MASSACRE 
Testimony of a witness who 
lost a leg 
I am Edi, a street vendor. I usually have a stall outside 
the Permai cinema in Jalan Vos Sudarso, Tanjung Priok. 
Every day from nine a.m., I take the clothing I have for 
sale to Blok Mor other places. In the evening, I open up 
my stall near the place where I live, after storing away 
my wares at my lodgings which is only about one kilometre 
from where I have my stall. So l use a push-cart to carry 
everything. 
On that evening (12 September 1984), I was out selling 
as usual and trade was brisker than usual because of all 
the people attending the pengajian {religious rally) in 
Jalan Sindang. Just as I was about to shut down my stall, 
I heard shooting. I quickly gathered up my things, 
bundled them into a sack and put them on my push-cart. 
On the way, I saw very many people. Some were being 
helped along by others, as if they had been hurt in an 
accident. I was very scared and pushed my way through the 
crowds of people to get back to my storage place as fast 
as possible. My kak.ak (older brother or sister) was there 
and told me not to go out again, so I stayed in the place 
where I lodge with my adik/ipar {younger brother or 
sister-in-law). I fell asleep straight away. Around two 
in the morning, I woke up feeling hungry. My stomach was 
rumbling because I had forgotten to have a meal. I woke 
my adik./ipar so that we could go together to a food-stall 
nearby, about 200 metres from my lodgings. After we had 
finished eating, my adik./ipar went home, but I stayed 
behind to have a smoke. 
As I was sitting there smoking, two fully-armed Armed 
Forces (AERI) men in uniform ccrne along. When they saw 
me, they stopped and yelled: ''You're a Batok, aren't 
you?" I replied: "No, I'm from Padang". Then one of them 
said: "Come with me." I asked him, "What have I done 
wrong, Sir?" He replied with another question: ''What are 
you doing here?'' I replied: "I've just had a meal, Sir. 
You can ask the lady who runs the stall."' But they 
yelled at me again: "fhat's enough of your lip. Come with 
us. If you don't, I'll give you a jab with this." As he 
said this, he pointed to the knife at the end of his 
rifle. 
I got very scared so I did what they told me. Whether 
it was because they pushed me or because l tripped (I 
don't know) but I fell down. Then one of them shot me in 
the right leg as I was lying there. The AERI men dragged 
me along for a while but then they let go of me and left 
me there on the side of the road. 
I called out to the woman at the food-stall to go and 
fetch my adik./ipar. Perhaps she was too frightened. My 
adik/ipar didn't turn up. Then someone happened to pass 
by and I asked to be carried to my lodgings. I was 
111 had lost a great deal of blood but 
the hospital refused to take me in ... 11 
carried back and the person even stayed the night at our 
place because he/she was too afraid to go out into the 
street again. When morning came, my adik./ipar went to 
tell my uncle and my kakak/ipar (older brother or sister-
in-law) who live near by. That whole night, I somehow 
bore the pain; it was almost beyond endurance. 
When my relatives arrived, they immediately started 
looking for public transport to take me to the nearest 
hospital. But there wasn't any public transport that day 
so they put me on the push-cart which I used for my 
wares. I remained conscious oil the time, though the pain 
was excruciating. I had lost a great deal of blood and my 
body was very cold. But the hospital near by refused to 
take me in because, they said, I must be taken to the 
"Gatot Soebroto" Army Hospital. 
When we got on to the main road, a taxi passed by and 
we took it to go to the ''Ga tot Soebroto" Army Hospital. 
But when we got there, I was turned away. Apparently, it 
was already full of patients. Then I was taken to Cipto 
Mangunkusumo Hospital where I was quickly given a blood 
transfusion. About two hours later, three ABRI men came 
and took me away. My relatives saw them and asked: "Where 
are you taking Edi? He's very ill." But one of the AERI 
men asked them in return: "Who are you?'' They repled: 
''We're his relatives." So they were taken as well. We 
were taken off in a jeep, not an crnbulance. 
When we arrived at a place which looked like the 
forecourt of an off ice building, my relatives were told 
to get down. I was left in the jeep for about an hour 
then I was taken somewhere else. As it turns out, I was 
taken back to the ''Gatot Soebroto" Hospital to be treated 
there. On 15 September 1984, they operated twice on the 
leg which had been shot at. In fact, they operated twice 
but the doctor who did the operation said my leg would 
have to be amputated from l 0 ems above the knee because 
the bone had been splintered by the bullet. 
I was in ''Gatot Soebroto" Army Hospital for about three 
months. The whole time I was there, no-one from my family 
came to visit me. I felt very sad about this at the time. 
It wasn't till later that I heard that my relatives had 
been refused permission to visit me. 
The whole time I was in hospital, I saw armed members 
of AERI keeping guard. In fact, I was not even allowed to 
go outside. On one occasion, I opened a window for some 
fresh air. Some nurses outside were playing volley-ball. 
A security guard saw me open the window and soon after, 
an AERI man came. He slapped me and yelled: ''You get all 
this nice food and have nothing to do here but sleep, yet 
you still want to peep out!" 
Once my injury had healed somewhat and I was able to 
walk, I was td<en by some ABRI officials to the military 
''They gave me Rp 500 and told me not 
to tell anyone anything ... " 
police headquarters in Jalan Guntur. I was detained there 
and interrogated for ten days. Then I was taken to an 
ABRI hostel in Cimonggis where I was detained for a day. 
There were many other people there in detention. 
Eventually, I was taken to the North Jakarta Kodim 
(District Military Command) together with 32 other people 
where I had to fill in a form about my personal details. 
Then they gave me some money, altogether five hundred 
rupiahs. Before releasing me and others, the Kodim 
commander told us not to tell anyone anything about our 
experiences. 
... 
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THE PRESS 
Arnied Forces coniniander lanibasts 
the press 
The Armed Forces corrmander-in-chief, General Benny 
Murdani has lashed out at the Indonesian press for 
"irresponsibility" and "irrmaturity", particularly in its 
reporting of the recent subversion trial of former army 
general, H.R. Dharsono. Many papers had reported that 
Dharsono was on trial because of his difference of 
opinion with the government whereas everyone knows(!), 
said Murdani, that he violated the law. 
He accused some newspapers of being "brengsek" (rotten) 
but without naming the papers he had in mind, he 
succeeded in putting all editors on their guard. [KCJnl>OS, 
6 February] 
He returned to the theme a week later when, addressing 
a parliamentary corrmission, he accused the press of being 
polluted by western liberalism and sensationalism, 
warning the press to carry out self-correction or else .•. 
An Armed Forces member of Parliament, retired General 
Sumrahadi, a former attorney-general and once in charge 
of ABRl's information section, complained that Indonesian 
press reporting of Dharsono's trial was biassed heavily 
in favour of the defendant and his lawyers. But another 
member, Rusli Deso thought the press should be given 
credit for imposing "self-censorship" when national 
stability questions were involved. [Kol'rl>CJs, 11 February] 
Murdani on the 'benefits' of self-censorship 
Returning yet again to the sane theme, Murdani told an 
audience of journalists at a Tempo seminar that, as 
Kopkamtib [Operational Corrmand for the Restoration of 
Security and Order] commander, he was gradually "widening 
the corridor" for the press. 'We've stopped using those 
yeUow cards ['early warnings'] and don't ban papers 
these days. Only the phone rings rather often. Aren't you 
pleased with this progress? If the phone rings, you're 
not being prohibited from printing something, only told 
it's a complex matter. If you go ahead and publish, and 
no-one reprimands you, you can count your blessings. But 
if you get a yellow card, then you shouldn't complain." 
He reminded his audience that Kopkamtib still has powers 
to ban the press. [Tempo, 15 March] 
GOU<AR td<es over PPP daily 
Meanwhile it has been announced that a senior executive 
merrber of the government's party, GOL.KAR, Akbar Tanjung, 
has taken over as editor of Pelita, the newspaper that 
has until now reflected the views of the rump Muslim 
party, PPP. This effectively ends any pretence of a 
Muslim voice in the national press and provides GOLKAR 
with a second mouthpiece in addition to its daily, Suara 
Karyo. Golkor's General Secretary, Sarwono Kusumaotmaja 
has also been given a seat on the paper's board of 
directors. 
This is the second government overhaul of Peli ta 
editorial control. In 1982, the paper was banned for 
publishing non-official election reports and was not 
allowed to re-appeared until the entire editorial board 
hod been replaced. 
There are hints that the Christian daily, Sinor Harapan 
may soon be subjected to similar treatment, for when 
Murdani was chastising journalists for their "irrrnature" 
reporting, he turned pointedly to an SH journalist to ask 
whether there was any truth to rumours that his paper 
might soon change hands. Bearing in mind the recent 
change at Peli ta, the Far Eastern Economic Review (6 
March) corrmented that it is "hard to dismiss Murdani 's 
query too readily". 
FEER journalist told to leave Indonesia 
Lincoln Kaye, the For Eastern Economic Review 
correspondent was forced to leave Indonesia at a few 
days' notice in mid March when the government refused 
to renew his visa. The previous F~ correspondent 
suffered the same fate, as well as several others 
before him. 
Although no official reason was given for his 
expulsion, it was not difficult to see this coming 
following recent reports, one on Murdani's warnings 
to the press [ ~ 6 March] and one on the Dharsono 
trial [~ 23 January]. Late last year, Kaye was 
"reprimanded" for a series of articles [~ 24 
October 1985) analysing the current re-organisation 
of the Armed Forces. 
Regretting that Kaye was being forced to leave 
Indonesia ofter only one year in the post, the ,fEER 
corrmented [27 Morch]: ''General Benny Murdani recently 
complained that journalists in Jakarta do not stay 
long enough to acquire any deep knowledge of the 
country. Not only does the treatment of Kaye 
discourage the cause of responsible journalism, it 
has cut short his considerable efforts to follow 
Murdani's advice and get to know the language and the 
people of Indonesia." 
During the course of his recent tirades against the 
media, General Murdani hos also attacked "foreign 
broadcasts" for corrrnentaries which "amount to 
interference in Indonesia's domestic affairs". The 
attack is apparently directed primarily at Radio 
Netherlands and Radio Australia. [Sydney Morning 
Herold, 8 Morch] 
Murdoni surrounded by journalists, ofter one of his many 
attacks on the press. [Photo: Tempo, 15 March 1986) 
At a seminar to mark the 15th anniversary of Tempo, 
Murdoni said: "Free press based on Poncosilo is not a 
free press without l imi tot ions." He said that it has been 
mistakenly assumed that social control can be carried out 
by whatever means through the press. While social control 
through the press has its advantages, the general said, 
the government is the only body that represents all the 
people. [Jakarta Post, 22 March 1986] 
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MUSLIM TRIALS 
Robots of justice 
The trials of lrfan Suryahadi (25) and Achmad Zonet 
Sumarlan (24) which started in October last year have 
ended with sentences of 13 years for I don the editor, 
and 6 years for Sumarlan, the distributor of Ar-Risalah 
(The Letter) and Al-lkhwan (The Brotherhood). The first 
of these publications was banned by the Attorney-General 
in October 1983, only to be replaced by the second which 
was reported in the press to have hod a run of 10,000 
copies, circulating in Jogjakarta, Solo, Surabaya, 
Bandung and Jakarta. 
Sumarlan, a student at the Technical Faculty of the 
Indonesian Islamic University was reportedly arrested on 
13 June 1985 although he insists he was picked up a week 
earlier on 6 June by Laksus (regional executive officer 
of Kopkomtib) [ Suara Merdekq 11 December 1985]. He was 
found guilty of distributing issues of the papers which 
dealt critically with government action following the 
Tonjung Priok events in September 1984, as well as 
distributing a panphlet entitled, "Poncasilo should be 
torn to shreds by every Muslim". Amnesty International 
has been investigating his case for adoption as a 
prisoner of conscience. 
Suryohadi, who edited both papers, was first arrested 
on 28 May 1985, before the banning of Al-lkhwan was made 
public in July. No charges were mode and he was released, 
but re - arrested in J.me with Sumerian for allegedly being 
in possession of a passport under a false name. Active in 
groups such a Badan Komunik.asi Pemuda Mesjid (Mosque 
Youth Communications Body), he is alleged to hove 
confessed under interrogation to having aspired to the 
goals of Kartosuwir}'O, a Muslim leader who established 
the Oarul Islam movEment in West Java in the late I 940s, 
in opposition to the Indonesian Republic [Surabaya Pos, 4 
October I 985]. 
He was tried on charges of challenging Pancasilo, 
questioning the authority of the Indonesian state 
leadership and opposing the family planning programme. 
The trial in the Siemon district court became something 
of a cause celebre, with many students attending every 
session. Prosecution witnesses included well-known Gadjah 
Mada University lecturers, Dr Kun tow idjoyo of the 
Philosophy Faculty, Ir Syachirul Alim and Dr Amin Rois. 
However, none of them appeared in person; the court 
accepted the reports of their interrogation as evidence 
even though this is not permissible under the rules of 
procedure. 
Accused both reject defence lawyers 
Neither of the defendants was willing to hove defence 
lawyers. ''God is my only ~efender," said Sumarlan 
lKedaulatan Rakyat, 10 October 1985]. Earlier, he 
complained of losing personal belongings at the time of 
his arrest [Sinor Harapan, 31 October 1985] He also 
objected to being tried in a State, not a Muslim, court. 
The presiding judge, Ngakon Nyoman Roi SH, was a Balinese 
Hindu, a choice calculated perhaps to antagonise the 
defendant. When he read out the charges, he mispronounced 
the Arabic greetings, whereupon Sumerian accused him of 
being sinful. The judge responded by somewhat 
provocatively spelling out the greeting letter by letter 
[Indonesia Reports, November 1985, 10 October]. 
When Ors Ojunaedi, head of the local Majelis Dak.wah 
Islam (Islamic Missionary Council) was questioned as a 
prosecution witness about the legitimacy of Pancasila, 
Sumerian objected that this had "absolutely no connection 
with the case", and a slanging match broke out in the 
court [Suara Merdeka, 27 November 1985]. The defendant 
also complained about being denied medical treatment for 
a stomach ailment [Merdeka, 18 December]. 
Irfon Suryahadi arriving in court on the day his verdict 
was announced. [Suara Herdek.a, 14 February 1986) 
None of the witnesses called by the defendant appeared, 
including Suryahadi who could certainly have been 
produced by the prosecution, had the court insisted on 
respecting Sumarlan's right to call witnesses. 
Press reporting of Suryahadi's trial focussed on the 
non-appearance of witnesses. Five of the prosecution 
witnesses failed to appear, apparently because the 
summonses had been delivered by courier (!) to 'dead-end' 
addresses from which the persons had already moved, 
"without leaving forwarding addresses", said the 
prosecutor. But nor did two other witnesses appear, 
although their summonses had been received by their 
families. It was suggested in court that witnesses ought 
to be given at least three days' notice [~s, 29 
November 1985] although whether this has anything to do 
with their not appearing remains a mystery. · 
As for the six witnesses requested by Suryahadi, not 
one appeared on the three occasions set aside for their 
testimony [Sinor Haropan, 27 January 1986]. Court abuse 
of the defendants' right to call witnesses makes a 
mockery of these subversion trials. 
Why not sentence me to death? 
When the court pronounced a sentence of 6 years {two 
years less than that demanded by the prosecution), 
Sumarlan challenged the court to sentence him to death, 
if indeed he was guilty of the charges. Suryohodi mode a 
similar remark when his sentence of 13 years was 
announced. 
As so often happens in these trials, the judges' 
surrming up established a curious connection between the 
length of the sentence and such matters as the 
defendant's age or demeanour. For being young, Sumorlon's 
sentence was reduced while his "insolence" worked in the 
opposite direction. Jn Suryahodi 's case, the judge made a 
point of comparing the defendant's "achievements" for his 
country with those of another defendant, H.R. Dharsono 
who hod been given a lighter sentence because "he hos 
already many achievements •••• But what hove you done for 
your country? You haven't even managed to be a good 
citizen." Moreover, according to the judge, Suryohodi's 
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"deviousness" also added to the sentence. It is as if 
brownie points are counted, while the defendant appears 
also to be being sentenced for contempt of court. 
It was also the court's contention that, "during the 
forthcoming general elections, lrfon and his masses (sic) 
would carry out a revolt", a thing the more lightly-
sentence Dharsono hod not apparently intended to do 
[Tempo, 22 February]. 
The court verdict claimed that Suryahodi's links with 
the shadowy 'Komando Jihad' and the so-called Biro 
Politik Negara Islam (Political Bureau of the Islamic 
State) had been indicated because he was believed to have 
been instrumental in appointing Syochirul Alim, a witness 
who failed to appear, and who is himself in detention in 
Jakarta [Sinor Harapan, 4 January 1986] as "chief Imam" 
of the "Indonesian Islamic State". 
Such irrproboble tales and the manipulation and blocking 
of witnesses is standard practice in Indonesian 
subversion trials. For his part, Suryahadi remained 
steadfast throughout the trial, and took a stand that was 
a delight to the student audiences present. 
He was possibly aware of an incident at the trial of 
Abdul Rany Yunsih in Jakarta, when the prosecutor 
demanded 17 years. The defendant responded by going up 
to prosecutor and presenting him with a toy robot which 
he hod wound up to make it walk along the prosecutor's 
desk [Kompas, 30 December 1985]. For his part, Suryahadi 
gave the prosecutor a caricature of him as a robot [Suara 
Merdeka, 28 January]. The meaning of these symbolic 
gestures was not lost on any-one from the press and in 
the public gallery. 
Six years for attending a 3-doy course 
A peasant from Central Java has been given a six-year 
sentence for attending a three-day course allegedly aimed 
at giving training in th_e delivery of ''militant" sermons. 
He was also accused of possessing or distributing a book 
entitled 'Muhibah'. 
Tubogus Muhcrrmad Jihad (22) was found guilty of 
subversion at the district court in Wates. He was said to 
have spread anti -Pancas ila ideology in a speech ofter 
attending the three-day course in Muntilon, and of then 
having set up a similar training course in his own 
village, Kulon Progo, although it is unclear whether any 
such training course ever took place. 
There was characteristic confusion at the comnencement 
of the trial over who would defend the accused [see TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 73, January 1986]. At one session, a member 
of military intelligence replaced one of the team of 
prosecutors who was unable to attend because he was 
attending a course of his own (for Pancasila 
indoctrination, of course) [ Suora Merdeko, 15 February]. 
The defendant rejected the charges. However, lack of 
press reporting has made it difficult to follow the 
defendant's case. After the verdict, the prosecutor, who 
had demanded a sentence of 15 years, announced that he 
would appeal against the sentence. The defendant's 
lawyers announced that they would not appeal, fearing no 
doubt that an appeal could only make things worse. 
By contrast with other subversion trials, this one had 
nothing to do with Tanjung Priok, the East Java bombings 
or similar events. 
Educational course verdicts increased on appeal 
Two of four men each sentenced to eight years in 
connection with the Islamic Crash-Course Educational 
Institute (t_embaga Pendidikan Pondok Pesantren Kilat) in 
Malang, East Java, have had their sentences increased on 
appeal. Andi Sukisno's sentence ~as been almost doubled, 
to 15 years. (The prosecutor had asked for 15 years for 
all four men.) Sugeng Budiono's sentence was increased 
from eight to nine years. The sentences of Murdjoko and 
Faisal Fochri were upheld. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 71, 
September 1985 for more details of these trials.] 
It is not clear from the press reports whether the 
appeals were lodged by the defendants or the prosecutor. 
Preacher accuses government of rigging verdicts 
Professor Oesmony Al Hamidy, 72, 
rector of the Islamic Missionary 
College [Perguruan Tinggi Dakwah 
Islam] is the oldest of the preachers 
now on trial for subversion. He was 
arrested on 14 September 1984, two 
days after the Tanjung Priok 
massacre. He hos rheumatism, and has 
spent much of his detention in 
hospital. 
He is charged with subversion. His 
alleged er imes all relate to his 
sermons. Last month, the prosecutor 
demanded a sentence of 12 years 
which, for a man his age, is 
equivalent to a life sentence. 
Following the prosecutor's demand, he 
was unable to attend four sessions 
because of illness. He eventually 
appeared in a wheel-chair, to present 
his own defence. He protested at 
being taken from hospital to attend. 
Professor Hamidy hos repeatedly 
expressed profound cynicism about the 
court proceedings against all his 
fellow mubaligh and hos poured scorn 
on the way sentences are fixed. He 
refused to accept legal aid, arguing 
that this cannot possibly hove any 
influence on the verdict, already 
pre-determined by the executive. 
When he presented his own defence 
statement on 17 March, he pointed out 
that the period allowed for detention 
expired two weeks earlier but he had 
not been released. Yet, the accused 
in a murder case was released 
recently when his detention period 
expired. "Are ulamas who preach 
sermons regarded as being more 
criminal than people accused of 
murder?'' he asked.[l«>nl>as, 18 March] 
Show trials 
Professor Hamidy's view of the 
subversion trials are summed up in a 
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statement he made at the start of the 
trial. The following are extracts: 
"Everyone present should know that 
I am being tried for subversion not 
because I am accused of plotting 
rebellion or taking up arms against 
the la w ful government, but only 
because I hold opinions that differ 
from the government's." 
"The prosecutors behave just like 
prosecutors in totalitarian states. 
T"he precedent established in these 
trials shows that the executive has 
unlimited powers. It uses ... the law 
arbitrarily to level charges 
punishable by death against anyone 
with dissenting views." 
"Everything we hoped for from the 
New Order has not borne fruit. Jn 
these show-trials, it is very evident 
that the judges side with the 
prosecution. The judges seem to be 
quite powerless. They submit to the 
wishes of the men in power, passing 
down sentences of great severity ... 
They have lost their independence." 
"These subversion trials are being 
held simply to provide the ruling 
circles with formal juridical grounds 
to punish certain people severely 'in 
the name of justice'. Defence lawyers 
have 110 meaning in such trials yet 
their presence is used by the rulers 
to claim that justice is being done." 
7 
ARMS SALES 
60 MPs of all parties oppose deal 
with Indonesia 
The following Early Day Motion was tabled in the House of Corrmons in February this year: 
That this House, alarmed that Indonesia is still engaged in a war against East Timar which it has occupjed illegally 
since December 1975, distressed by continuing reports of human rights violations in East Timar documented most recentl.y 
by Amnesty International in a report last year, concerned that a contract was concluded by British Aerospace with 
Indonesia in December 1985 for the sale of £82.7 million worth of Rapier missiles on top of an even larger contract 
concluded a year before., and that discussions are under way for the export from Britain of Hawk. fighter aircraft and 60D 
Scorpion light tanks, both of which are suitable for use in East Timar, calls upon Her Majesty's Government to halt the 
sale of arms and military equipment to Indonesia and to press Indonesia to end its military operations in East Timar and 
enable the people of that country to exercise their right to self-determination. 
The Motion was signed by the following Members ·of Parliament. MPs whose names are in emboldened type sponsored the 
motion: 
David Alton, L; Paddy Ashdown, L; Guy Barnett, Lab; Alan 
Beith, L; Sydney Bidwell, Lab; Sir Bernard Broine, Con; 
Jeremy Bray, Lab; Norman Buchan, Lab; Dennis Canavan, 
Lab; Alex Carlisle, L; John Cartwright, SOP; Tom Clarke, 
Lab; Harry Cohen, Lab; Robin Corbett, Lab; Patrick 
Cormack, Con; Tom Cox, Lab; Lawrence Cunliffe, Lab; Terry 
Davis, Lab; Eric Deakins, Lab; Alf Dubs, Lab; Gwyneth 
Dunwoody, Lab; John Evans, Lab; Andrew Foulds, Lab; 
Martin Flannery, Lab; John Fraser, Lab; Reg Freeson, Lab; 
Norman Godman, Lab; Bryan Gould, Lab; Harry Greenway, 
Con; Dame Judith Hart, Lab; Robert Hicks, Con; Stuart 
Holland, Lab; Geraint Howells, Lab; Sean Hughes, Lab; 
John Hunt, Con; Sir Russell Johnstone, L; David Knox, 
Con; AnthonyUoyd,Lab; Hugh McCartney, Lab; Alan McKay, 
Lab; J. Marek, Lab; Joan Maynord, Lob; Michael 
Meadowcroft, L; David Penhaligon, L; P.L Pike, Lob; 
Timothy Rathbone, Con; Ernie Roberts, Lab; Clare Short, 
Lab; Renee Short, Lab; Chris Smith, Lab; Robin Squire, 
Con; DafyddThomas, Pl Cymru; Jack Thompson, Lab; Richard 
Wainwright, L; R. Wareing, Lab; John Wheeler, Con; and 
Dafydd Wigley, Pl Cymru. 
* * * * * * 
An amended version of the Early Day Motion was tabled in 
which the last four lines reads as follows: 
... calls upon Her Majesty's Government to immediately 
halt t11e sale of arms and military equipment to Indonesia 
and to press Indonesia to end its military operations in 
East Timar and enable the people of that country to 
exercise their right to self-determination. 
This amended Motion was signed by: Terry Fields, Lab; 
Dave Nellist, Lab; and Bob Parry, Lab. 
Con = Conservative Party; 
Lab = Labour Party; 
L = Liberal Party; 
Pl Cymru = Welsh Nationalist 
Party; 
SDP 
Party 
= Social Democratic 
More details of U< arms sales 
In the course of our campaign against British arms sales 
to Indonesia, we have received information of more deals: 
* Irvin Great Britain, producers of parachutes, have 
concluded a deal worth £2.7 million for the supply of 
paratroop equipment to the Indonesian Armed Forces. The 
deal was reported in January this year in several papers 
in Letchworth, the town where the company is based. The 
para-corrmando unit Kopassus will be the beneficiary of 
this deal. 
All exports of parachutes require a government 
licence. 
* British Marconi has won an order to provide a 
corrmunications system for an unidentified Indonesian 
warship, probably the submarine 'Multatuli ', the flagship 
of Indonesia's Eastern Fleet. [Military Technology, No 
12, 1985) 
The latest addition to 
the Indonesian Navy, the 
Tribal Class frigate 
supplied by Britain, 
arrived in Tanjung Priok, 
Jakarta, on 7 March. 
Formerly the HMS Ghurka 
in the British Navy, this 
warship has been renamed 
the Wilhelmus Zakarias 
Yohannes.It was fully 
overhauled at the 
Vosper-Thorneycroft 
shipyard in Portsmouth 
and should be in service 
for at least ten years. 
The first of the three 
frigates suppfied by 
Britain arrived in 
Indonesia last August. 
[Kampos, 7 March 1 986] 
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* Royal Ordnance is taking advantage of the "protracted 
negotiations" between Alvis and Indonesia for the sale 
to, or product ion in Indonesia of Scorpion tanks, to 
negotiate to sell Indonesia their 70 rrm gun for the 
Scorpions. Local manufacture of the 76 mm system is 
offered by Royal Ordnance, should the Alvis deal come 
through. [Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 March 1986) 
* * * * * * * 
On 21 March, TAPOL wrote to Foreign Secretary Sir 
Geoffrey Howe about these latest deals, and said: 
In view of the frequent confirmation we have had from 
the Foreign Office that it is government policy not to 
supply arms where they may be used for purposes of 
internal repression, there seems to be no justification 
for government authorisation of these deals. The whole of 
the Indonesian Armed Forces has been responsible for a 
wide range of human rights abuses ever since General 
Suharto came to power in 1965, but by far the worst 
Readers' Column 
I read with interest the article from your special 
correspondent in Jakarta in TAPOL Bulletin, No. 72, 
November 1985,which mentions the relation between the PKI 
[Indonesian Communist Party] and General Amir Machmud, 
now chairman of the DPR [People's Representative Council 
or Parlicrnent ]. The fact that he was a registered member 
of the PKI has often been publicised, also in an article 
I wrote in Demi Dermkrasi (Vol. I, No. 2, 1985, page 22) 
for which I was strongly criticised by many mentally-
deficient Indonesian political refugees in Europe. But 
your correspondent went farther, mentioning who swore him 
in and where, and giving details of his subsequent career 
up to his appointment to the strategic position of 
military commander of the capital, Jakarta. We are left 
with no further room for doubt. 
More revelations like this are needed simply because 
the more we know, the better. Is there anyone for example 
who knows anything about the relation between General 
Suharto and the PKI'! I remember gossip circulating around 
1960 suggesting that the PKI favoured Suharto's 
appointment to corrmand the Mandala Operation [for the 
incorporation of West Irion, then still in Dutch hands]. 
It was even rumoured that the PKI leadership was 
instrumental in promoting Suharto's promotion as 
commander of Kostrad, the Army Strategic Corrmand, the 
position from which he took power in 1965. Were this 
true, we might then know how far the flirtation between 
the PKI and its butcher actually went. Was the dictator, 
Suharto, also an undercover member of the PKI? 
I was disappointed however that your correspondent went 
on to say that Amir Machmud was a CIA agent. There's no 
harm to be told this of course, but where does it lead? 
Everyone knows the CIA and the KGB recruit agents in 
countries like Indonesia, so we don't need a full list of 
names. What we do need is a thoroughgoing analysis of the 
30 September 1965 affair. Your correspondent's remark 
only leads down a blind alley, as it means throwing the 
blame for the affair on the easy-to-blcrne-ugly-American-
imperial ist power and, in so doing, exonerates the PKI 
from responsibility. This is very dangerous indeed for it 
prevents us from identifying and locating the mistakes of 
the past and consequently of avoiding such mistakes in 
the future. 
If it is indeed the task of the obssessively anti-
corrmunist American secret service to fight anything 
resembling corrmunism anywhere in the world, it is also 
the task of marxists to avoid falling into traps. In this 
particular case, if some PKI members were CIA agents, 
there's Ii ttle point spending too much time blaming the 
CIA; rather, we should accept the fact that the PKI is 
the main culprit for thH; mistake. This truth needs to be 
offender has been the elite paratroop command, known as 
Kopassus (formerly Kopassandha and RPKA DJ, the 
beneficiary of the Letchworth deal. 
Paracommandos ... were responsible for more than 4,000 
extra-judicial killings in 1983 during the officially 
sponsoredanti-cri me operation. The same command has been 
responsible for some of the worst human rights abuses in 
Irian Jaya while attempting to crush the OPH resistance 
movement, and killed the widely known and respected 
anthropologist, Arnold Ap, in April 1984. The 
paracommandos have been most conspicuous in East Timar 
where they have spread terror among the population which 
calls them 'nanggala' or knife-carriers, ·Apart from 
frequent reports of indescribable human rights abuses at 
the hands of these troops, the paracommandos ha..,e 
spearheaded all Indonesia's major offensives against 
Fretilin, the East Ti morese resistance. 
Neither Britain nor the UN General Assembly recognises 
Indonesia's occupation of East Ti mor as legitimate, and 
it seems ine"cusable that this country should supply the 
forces most involved in Indonesia's illegal war. 
recognised, for as Lenin once said: "It is worse to close 
your eyes to an error than to corrmi t one." The main task 
of the Indonesian left today is to analyse past mistakes. 
One of the main historical errors corrmitted by the PKI 
leadership was their acceptance of the concept of 
"progressive military officers". Any military man who 
dabbles in politics is, by definition, anti-democratic 
and hence reactionary, whether he is Abdul Haris 
Nasution, Amir Machmud or the Iraqi officers who took 
power in 1958 and who Sudiman mentions in his Analysis of 
Responsibility [See C. Budiardjo in Demi Demokrasi, Vol. 
I, No 3, page 21]. Moreover, acceptance of this concept 
is even more difficult to understand if we remember that 
some PKI leaders, including Nyoto, knew that the level of 
civilisation of the Indonesian Armed Forces was extremely 
low [See Pramudyo's letter to Keith Foulcher, in Demi 
Demokrasi. Vol II, No 2, 1985, page 16].To have accepted 
such a concept was worse than an error; it was a crime. 
Or to put it more bluntly, it was a crime that stood in 
the path of democracy in Indonesia, the crime that 
ultimately led to the establishment of the bloodiest 
military dictatorship in the world today. Amir Machmud's 
recruitment to the CIA, if proven, would not change that, 
nor would it lessen the PKl's responsibility for the 
crime. The only extenuating circumstance is that all 
other politic al parties in Indonesia were, and still are, 
doing precisely the same thing. 
Jusfiq Hadjar 
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West Papuans secretly removed from Jayapura 
Twelve West Popuons, some token from places of detention and some from their homes, were moved from Jayapura to an 
unknown destination on 27 January this year. They were token to Sentoni Airport and put on a Hercules pl~ne, the ~ype 
used to transport tronsmigronts from Java to West Papua. They may hove been token to Java, possibly to Kalisosok Prison 
in Surabaya. Relatives who were unable to discover what had happened, fear for their safety. The sudden transfer came 
following a series of dctions launched by the OPM in and around Jayapura •. 
The twelve men ore: 
" Terianus Aronggear (48) formerly a teacher, now a 
businessman; fought with the OPM in tl1e mid 1960s in 
Manokwari. Has been in and out of prison. On this 
occasion, he was taken from his home. 
* Edi Aronggear (Willem Auparay) (33), a teacher at a 
Christian elementary school in Nabire. Has been 
previously detained for 0 PM sympathies. 
11 Salmon Hansoben (33), an economics graduate from 
Cendra wasih University in 1915. and employee of the Irian 
Jaya Joint Development office: 
" Gerry Rabrageri (34), fought with the OPM in 
Manokwari in the mid 1960s. More recently a teacher at 
the Polimaq IV Christian primary school in Jayapura. 
Believed to have been tried for involvement in tl1e 
Februory 1984 uprising and was held in Abepura Prison. 
" Jonas Rejauw (26), social science student at 
Cendrawasih University. Sentenced to 5 years in 1985 for 
alleged involvement in Arnold Ap's 'escape' from prison. 
" Dicky Sorontouw (Serontouw) (28) formerly in the 
Indonesian Military Police with the Cendrawasih [now 
Trikora} Military Command. _May have been tried in 
connection with the February 1984 uprising in Jayapura. 
Renewed OPM actions in .Jayapura 
There are several reports about renewed OPM activity in 
and around Jayapura. It appears there were several flag-
raising attempts in mid January in the region of Arso, 
.Jayapura district. An explosive device was thrown at the 
Jayapura General Hospital in Abepura. One report soys 
this occurred on 20 January. Someone who later approached 
the area to photograph the damage was chased by troops 
Repatriated refugees are being sent to 
government relocation sites 
Nearly 300 West Popuon refugees who hove returned to 
Indonesian-held Irion Joya since February hove not been 
allowed to go back to their villages but hove been 
'relocated' to sites designated by the authorities. The 
first group of 46 from camps in Western Province in the 
southern border region of Popuan New Guinea were returned 
to Merouke in south-east Ir ion Joyo. Then, 31 were 
returned from Blackwater Camp near Vonimo, up in the 
north, to Jayapura, the capital of Indonesia's province 
of Irion Joya. A day later, another group of 213 refugees 
from two comps in the north, Kamberotoro and Amonap were 
returned to Jayapura. [Kanpas, 10 and 11 March 1986] 
According to lzoac Hindom, governor of Irion Joya, they 
were given three "choices" - to enter a nucleus estate 
(PIR) project in Arso, to enter a 'translok' site, in 
other words, a transmigration site for local inhabitants 
as distinct from transmigration sites where mainly 
Javanese peasants ore resettled, or to enter a relocot ion 
site which is under the control of the Deportment of 
Social Affairs. [Kampas, 11 Morch 1986) These sites are 
oil integral to Indonesio 1 s population-relocation 
progrurrrre for West Papuons, aimed at bringing scattered 
villagers from the interior into sites or centres that 
are accessible to acministrative control by the 
Indonesian military and non-military authorities. 
11 A gustinus (Gust.av) Tana wani (29) a student at 
Cendra wasih University, Faculty of Education. Believed to 
have been tried in connection with the February 1984 
uprising. 
* Daniel Tanawani (36) from Serui, an undergraduate at 
the Home Affairs Academy. 
11 Selfianus Upuya (45) from Serui. Employed by a 
company in Nabire. Was arrested there in 1984, then 
detained by the Military Police in Jayapura. 
* Pius Wanane, a student at the community health 
program me at Cendra wasih University. Was also employed by 
the government health service in Jayapura. Previously 
arrested for allegedly supplying drugs to the DP M. 
* Jered (Jeret) Wayoi, formerly a police sergeant-
major. He is serving a 14-year sentence on charges 
connected with the February 1984 uprising in Jayapura. 
* Benyamin Demena (29), was detained after the February 
1984 uprising. 
Amnesty International launched an Urgent Action on 11 
March on behalf of the men being held incorrrnunicado, 
based on fears for their safety, because of the 
surreptitious way they were removed. 
and his camera was confiscated. 
OPM sources have reported a number of actions in 
Jayapura district, and claim to hove killed Indonesian 
troops in Tor Atos, Jayapura: three infantrymen on 9 
September 1985, 16 infantrymen on 28 October, seven 
policemen on 5 November. On 15 January, an Indonesian 
military transport was destroyed. Other actions took 
place in Urum Guai, Jayapura when a sentry was killed on 
26 January, and in Tembagapura, Fd<-Fak district when an 
oil pipeline was destroyed in February, 
OPM guerrillas use sharpened sh~es to prevent aircraft 
landing. [From, Indonesia's Secret War by R. Osborne] 
Refugees who were repatriated last year hove also ended 
up in government-controlled resettlement locations. In 
January this year, 452 repotrionts were resettled in two 
locations in Arso, Jayapura district. Bas Jouwe, the 
Indonesian official who opened the sites, said the 
purpose was "to transform their mentality while raising 
their standard of living". He called on people "still 
rooming in the forests" to contact the authorities and 
"join in developing the region" [ Suora Koryo, 4 Jan). 
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When the recent repatriations occurred, both PNG and 
lndones ion officials expressed the hope that these were 
the first of a series that would take place on a regular 
basis. The PNG officials who escorted the group of 31 
said the "border-crossers" in camps, who number around 
10,500 according to the latest UNHffi figure, "would be 
returned to Irion Joya in stages". [l<orrf>as, 10 March 
1986] On the other hand, Catholic missionaries working 
among the refugees said this repatriation "is not 
expected to lead to any large-scale return from the 13 
camps along the border''. [Jakarta Post, 11 March 1986] 
PNG-Indonesia repatriation plan 
Since the Paias Wingti government took over in PNG, 
their new policy on refugees announced in January has 
been thoroughly discussed with Jakarta. Following the 
visit by PNG Foreign Minister Legu Vagi to Jakarta at the 
end of January, it was announced that Indonesia 
"respects" PNG's decision to accede to the UNHCR 
refugees' convention. PNG announced that border canps 
would be relocated further inland, that any 'border-
crossers' identified as political refugees would be 
required to remain in camps until third-country asylum 
had been found, and that PNG and Indonesia have agreed to 
conclude an extradition treaty. Well before the UNHCR had 
been given a chance to evaluate the status of any of 
the refugees, both PM Wingti and Foreign Minister Vagi 
expressed the opinion that all but a few hundred West 
Papuans now in PNG camps would be "integrated back to 
Irion Jaya". [Wingti interviewed by ABC on 28 January and 
Vag i quoted in Kompas, 1 February] 
While nothing is yet known about canp relocation in 
PNG, it appears that a coordinated prograrrme of 
repatriation is now under way. Moreover, the repatriation 
progrorrme is being used to promote Indonesia's long-
stated intention to relocate West Papuans. 
Virtually nothing can be ascertained about the methods 
or pressures used to persuade refugees in the camps to 
return home. A UNHCR official was at hand in Vanimo when 
the largest group left by ship for Jayapura. He is quoted 
as saying [Jakarta Post, 11 March 1986] that they "were 
excited about going back". 
Nor will it be easy to evaluate the fate of returnees 
in the controlled sites to which they are being sent. The 
UNHffi has no standing in Indonesia to monitor this. 
Wabo Camp for political refugees 
According to UNHffi sources, a special camp is now in 
preparation to accommodate all West Papuan refugees who 
are recognised as political refugees during the screening 
soon to take place. The place apparently chosen by the 
PNG au1·horities is Wabo Camp on the south coast, a remote 
and unattractive site, described by observers as nothing 
less than a bleak prison camp. It would be a gross act of 
inhumanity to consign hundreds of political refugees and 
their families to live in such a place, waiting for 
third-country asylum which could take years to secure .. 
More Papuans arrive in Australia 
Another six West Papuans, four men and two women, 
have landed on an Australian island north of Darwin 
and have asked for asylum. They reached the island of 
Melville in a small boat. This brings to sixteen the 
nurrber of West Papuans who have made their way to 
Australia direct from the southern shore of 
Indonesian-controlled West Papua or from PNG. 
Military cooperation between Indonesia and PNG 
A visit to Indonesia by the PNG Defence Forces Conniander, 
Brig-Gen. Huai, has heralded much closer links between 
the armed forces of the two countries. In Jakarta at the 
invitation of Benny Murdani, Huai announced he had asked 
for Indonesian assistance to train PNG officers. It has 
also been agreed to exchange military attaches [Jakarta 
Post, 17 and 21 March]. In addition to this, a decision 
has been taken to carry out joint military exercises. 
General Murdani clearly hopes soon to persuade PNG to 
agree to joint military patrols along the border. Asked 
about such a prospect, Brig~Gen. Huai said no plans had 
yet been drafted but the two countries were exchanging 
information on developments in the border region, "to 
avoid incidents" [Jakarta Post, 17 March]. 
This will certainly be unwelcome news to OPM forces 
fighting the Indonesian army near the PNG-West Papuan 
border, especially as Huai promised Indonesia that PNG 
would ensure the OPM did not operate from its side of 
the border. 
The ease with which the Wingti government has been 
able to foster good relations with Jakarta fuels 
suspicions that there are close links between the PNG 
Foreign Affairs Department and the Indonesian regime. 
The announcement in January that PNG would accede to the 
UN Convention and Protocol on Refugees contradicted 
Indonesia's earlier insistence that the West Papuan 
refugees were a bilateral issue, yet no protest has come 
from Jakarta. It is being suggested that Jakarta's more 
flexible attitude on the refugee issue is calculated to 
win concessions from Port Moresby·on the all-important 
question of closer military collaboration. 
PNG Foreign Minister Legu Vagi recently announced that 
he expected a friendship treaty with Indonesia to be 
signed later in the year, and that he hod won the 
Indonesians over to PNG'.s view on the refugees, something 
When General Suharto met Brig-General Huai in Jakarta, he 
assured him that Indonesia has no plans to invade PNG 
[Jakarta Post, 17 Morch 1986] 
no minister before him was able to do [..Jm<orta Post, 21 
March]. Vagi spent over three years in Jakarta before 
taking up his present post, and it seems likely that he 
established close contacts with influential Indonesian 
officials, and was won over to their way of thinking, 
rather than the other way around. PNG's acclaimed new 
policy towards the refugees still is not convincing to 
those who know how PNG has been pressurised by both 
Indonesia and Australia in the post. 
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WEST PAPUA 
No outside observers present at 
subversion trials in Jayapura 
Seven of the twelve West Popuon refugees forced back into 
Indonesian custody by. PNG in October lost year may 
already hove been tried for alleged involvement in thP. 
OPM, and for allegedly killing Indonesian soldiers. 
Amnesty International, human rights lawyer Bernard 
Narakobi and other NGOs have tried to have the trials 
monitored by outside observers, without success. Trials 
in Irion Joya are never reported in the Indonesian media 
and ore certainly never fair. 
The seven men ore: Elias Koreni, Lucas Moro, Isaak 
Rumpai sum, Amos Sorondanyo, Edi son Yakadewa, Som Yaru and 
lomech Yoafif i. The five other deportees, Benny Buoi, 
EAST TIMOR 
RehabiamNion,Robbie Nian, Aben Pagowd< and John Seserai 
have reportedly been released, but this does not mean 
they are out of danger. As Corry Ap, wido.w of r:nurde~ed 
anthropologist Arnold Ap, confirmed in on interview with 
TAPOL, West Papuans ore often held for sev~ral months, 
then released, only to be kidnapped or killed, or to 
disappear later [TAPa.. Bulletin 73, January 1986 ]. 
The case of the seven men was widely covered in 
Australia after they were interviewed by a porlianentory 
delegation from the opposition Liberal Party. The meeting 
took place at the invitiation of the governor, Isaak 
Hindom, and caused sc>me discomfort to Indonesian 
officials. In the event, with some forty Indonesians 
present, the prisoners were intimidated into saying 
virtually nothing about their detention. One puper 
described it as an exercise seemingly arranged "to exert 
~sychological pressure on the lrianese being held'' 
lfinonciol Review 31 January 1986 ]. 
Fretilin and UDT join forces internationally 
For the first time in more than ten years,the UDT (Union 
for a Democratic Timar) and Fretilin (Revolutionary Front 
for on Independent East Timor) have joined forces to 
campaign internationally for East Timer's self-
determination. 
Moises do Costa Amoral, on behalf of UDT, told a press 
conference in Lisbon, held with Fretilin, that they were 
joining forces because of the threat of genocide facing 
their people. "Our two groups ... are uniting in a joint 
initiative to carry the question of East Timor into the 
international spotlight." [The Australian, 26 March 1986] 
The two parties had a coalition in early 1975 but the 
UDT quit, under Indonesian pressure, and hostilies broke 
out between the two parties in August 1975. Since then, 
resistance to the Indonesians has been under Fretilin 
leadership. Since 1983, Fretilin has made it clear it 
favours political plurality, and has negotiated with UDT 
members in Australia and Portugal to create o new 
collaboration. 
New Portuguese President supports self-determination 
On the occasion of his installation on 16 Morch, Mario 
Soares, the new President of Portugal, spoke of his 
continuing pre-occupation with East Timor, in accordance 
with international low. "According to the Portuguese 
Constitution," he went en, "Portugal is still responsible 
for East Timor. To be faithful to these principles, we 
will continue to affirm and fight, within the limits of 
our resources, for the inalienable right of the East 
Timorese people for self-determinot ion and independence." 
Portugal has been involved in consultations with 
Indonesia since late 1984. Indonesia has foiled every 
attempt by Portugal to discuss what the lotter refers to 
as "an honorable solution". The only result of the talks 
has been on ogreerrent to allow a small number of people 
to repatriate. Indonesia has agreed that 24 families, 
whose family- heads were formerly employed by the 
Portuguese administration, may leave East Timor. 
By refusing to allow the self-determination issue to be 
raised in the talks, Indonesia hopes to compel the UN 
Secretory-General, who is shortly due to retire, to 
accept that consultations hove failed and that there is 
no point keeping East Timor on the UN agenda any more. 
Australian press trying to forget East Timor 
There is now a tendency within the Australian media to 
attempt to "put East Timor behind us" and come into line 
with Canberra's determination to clean up Indonesia's 
image abroad. An example of this is an article entitled 
l'imor's hard times approaching on end" [ Niugini Nius, 7 
Morch], by Leigh Mackay of AAP. He claims that most 
younger generation Timorese "appear to be adopting to 
Jakarta's rule". During a 24-hour trip to Dili, he seems 
to have met only Indonesian-appointed off iciols. He 
points a picture of impressive economic development and 
of Dili as o "bustling centre". But he also quotes puppet 
governor Mario Carascolao as admitting that "perhaps 
100,000 died'' in the war that began in 1975. 
Storvot ion-related deaths in Iliomar 
His article nevertheless brings to light some gruesome 
facts about present-day East Timor, ncrnely that dozens of 
deaths occurred at lliomor near the south-east coast last 
August-September, 'most from starvation-related illnesses 
according to some, or from measles according to others." 
He also reports that malaria is widespread, "the number 
one enemy". He did not explain, however, that until 
Indonesia took over, most Timorese peasants avoided 
living in the coastal plains where they ore now forced to 
dwell, precisely because malaria is so endemic there. 
On the military situation, he said Fretilin guerrillas 
"remain a disruptive force" who, according to Jakarta 
military sources, ''killed at least 170 (Indonesian) 
troops, police and militia, last year, and wounded many 
more, o large toll for a conflict that is officially 
described as insignificant and goes unreported in the 
Indonesian media." 
David Lange Woos Suharto 
New Zealand Prime Minister David Longe has gained on 
enviable reputation for concern about the peoples of the 
Pacific region and willingness to stand up to the USA and 
France over nuclear weapons. What is less well known is 
his refusal to say anything on behalf of the most 
oppressed Pacific peoples, the West Papuans and East 
Timorese. Whatever principles he may hold, they do not 
extend to Indonesia. 
On a recent vis it to Indonesia where he met Suharto, 
trade, regional stability and technological transfer 
were discussed, with no mention of human rights, East 
Timor or West Papua. All efforts by groups in New 
Zealand and elsewhere to get him to raise these issues 
with the Indonesian goverrment hove failed. Lange instead 
strives for good relations with Jakarta, in keeping with 
the policy of New Zealand's neighbour, Australia. 
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AUSTRALIA ANO INDONESIA 
Oil takes over as the key issue 
Bill Hayden's 'Low Key' visit to Jakarta 
Australia's Foreign Minister, Bill Hoyden, managed to 
pock in a number of meetings with Indonesian officialdom 
during a 4-doy visit to Indonesia, billed as 'unofficial' 
and 'low key'. The atmosphere during the visit was 
constantly described as 'worm','constructive' and 
'friendly', "helped by a decline in tension over East 
Timor" [Sydney Morning Herold, 4 Morch] 
Together with Australian ambassador, Bill Morrison, 
Hayden had a private dinner with Armed Forces Commander 
General Murdoni, with whom Morrison is known to have a 
close and long-standing relationship. He met Planning 
Minister, Suparlon and Home Affairs Minister, retired 
General Supordjo Rustom with whom he discussed 
Australian aid to development projects in eastern 
Indonesia, presumably including West Papua and East 
Timor. 
But it was at his meeting with Foreign Minister Mochtar 
Kusumoatmoja that the most important issues were 
discussed, a decision to speed up negotiations on the 
'Timor Gap' maritime boundary, more contacts between 
Australia and East Timor, and the forthcoming visit by 
President Suharto to Australia. The Suharto visit was 
originally scheduled for 1986 but Mochtar now says it 
cannot take place until after the 1987 elections. 
Jakarta Post [4 Morch] quotes Hayden as saying there 
were "no supporters of Fretilin among East Timorese 
living in Australia". Whether this was wishful thiriking 
on the part of Hayden or of the Jakarta Post is difficult 
to determine. He also boasted that his government had 
never given asylum to "Fretilin rebels". He did not add 
that "Fretilin rebels" have hod the chance to seek asylum 
anywhere, and are given only the choice of fighting or 
dying. 
Exploiting Timor's oil 
According to the Sydney Morning Herold (4 March), 
fv4ochtor suggested a definition of the area for the 
proposed joint development zone to be located around the 
'Timor Gap'. The idea of o joint development zone (JDZ) 
was adopted in talks lost October, to by-poss the dispute 
between the two countries over the marine boundary and 
allow the exploitation of oil reserves to go ahead. Brood 
agreement also appears to have been reached that the two 
countries will equally shore revenues from petroleum 
exploitation in the JDZ. 
Negotiations have been proceeding "too slowly" in the 
past six years, soi d fv4ochtor, and he intended to toke a 
personal hand in the matter. It hos now been agreed in 
Jakarta that full-scale talks will td<e place in Moy this 
year. By disregarding East Timor's right to self-
determinotion, both countries side-step the fact that 
neither of them has any right to be disposing of wealth 
in this region. 
Canberra reaping millions from 'Timor Gap' permit areas 
While Hoyden was paving the way to resolving the 
boundary issue, it was announced bock home that the 
Australian government hod received bids for three areas 
of the Timor Seo, for petroleum exploitation. These hod 
been offered to petroleum companies under a new cash-
bidding system and the bids mode will rake in no less 
than A$31.5 mill ion for the Australian treasury. The 
leading company in the three consortia making the bids is 
Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP). 
\. \ \ . 
\ 
The Age, 7 December 1985 
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Mrs Thatcher and 81-F 
It has recently come to light that the British Prime 
Minister, Margaret Thatcher has more than 2,000 shares in 
Broken Hill Proprietary, and therefore hos a direct 
interest in dealings surrounding the exploi totion of 
'Timor Gap' oil. 
Northern Territory premier togs along 
Hayden is not alone in his efforts. Ian Tuxworth, Chief 
Minister of Australia's Northern Territory, recently 
went to Jakarta and East Timor to investigate the 
possibility of some East Timorese refugees in Darwin 
returning home. He also accepted Indonesian claims about 
East Timor unchallenged, making the remarkable 
observation, from his brief, highly restricted visit, 
that "no-one tci<es any notice of (Fretilin) any more" 
[The Australian, 4 March]. With well over 10,000 troops 
in East Timor and the Indonesian authorities on full 
alert for Tuxworth's visit, he could hardly have expected 
to meet Fretilin supporters along the roadside. 
Bob Hawke, the Philippines and Indonesia 
"And why did Hr Hawke find it distasteful to visit 
the Philippines under President Marcos but okay to 
visit Indonesia under ·President Suharto? Is it 
because Hr Marcos and his former first lady were 
bigger rip-off merchants than President Suharto and 
!bu Tien? You'd have to be kidding. 
"Did Mr Hawke object to the Philippines' rigged 
elections sgstem? If he did then whg not the fact 
that in the past 20 gears, Indonesia's New Order 
Government has not held an election that was not 
rigged and the results in the final analgsis 
guaranteed by guns? ••• 
"Hg colleague David Jenk.ins who had a well-deserved 
bash at Hr Hawke on Fridag, made the important point 
that Indonesia has proved a success storg, inviting 
approval, and that the Philippines has not. It's an 
interesting observation, even if a perverse reason 
for Indonesia's success is the ruthless manner in 
which the regime ensures that evergbodg acclaims it 
as such. That's what Golkar is all about. In regional 
coercive politics, Suharto's Golk.ar leaves Marcos' 
KBt for dead." 
Peter Hastings in the Sydney Morning Herald, 3 Morch. 
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INTERVIEW 
Corry Ap talks about the refugees 
and the cantps 
The following is the second part of an interview of Corry Ap, the widow of Arnold Ap who was killed by Kopassus 
(paracorrrnando) troops on 26 April 1984, after being tricked to escape from prison together with four other prisoners. 
Corry arrived in Holland in December last year with her four sons, and is now living there with relatives. The first 
part of this interview was published in TAPOL Bulletiii. No 73, January 1986. 
C<Jrll> conditions 
What about conditions in the camps? Someone just back 
from the border reports that things are very bad in 
Bewoni. 
There's a tendency to treat the refugees at Blackwater 
better than those in other camps. They're intellectuals, 
goverrrrient employees and they get a better deal than the 
people in the other comps who are village or kompung 
dwellers. Also, the people in Blackwater are likely to 
protest when they're treated badly so the government has 
to pay more attention. Villagers ore less able to do 
this. 
At first when the refugees started arriving in PNG, 
treatment from all sides was good. Then ofter the nine 
were returned in December 1984, followed by the 120 (or 
90) people, then the four who were deported and murdered 
back home, then the deportation of the 12 (last October), 
the refugees have felt very uneasy that such things could 
happen to them at any time. This is why they hope to move 
elsewhere. They dont trust this new government, which 
probably already hos its own plans. Even though they hove 
made statements about wonting to release the refugees, in 
the end they will act in the same way as before. 
Take for instance food. Things were good at first, but 
then restrictions were imposed on selling food. The 
refugees hove been able to tend gardens, and they wont to 
sell their produce. Sometimes they get permission, but 
sometimes they don't. If the refugees aren't found places 
in third countries, they want to live where they are, 
growing food and living from their own resources without 
government assistance. But to do this, they would also 
need freedom of movement. 
Why were some Blackwater refugees sent to T elefomin? 
It seems the PNG authorities regarded them as the 
leaders of the refugees, Being intellectuals, they were 
able to make reports about what goes on. Telefomin is 
very remote and con only be reached by mission aircraft. 
After the first group of refugees had been moved to 
Telefomin, others realised what was going on, so when 
officials tried to move some more, they fought against 
being put on to planes and said, "Before we agree to go, 
you must move all the others first. We want to be the 
last to go". They felt responsible for everything. They 
were afraid that if they could be got out of the way, it 
would be easy for the authorities to force the other 
refugees back to .Jayapura where anything could happen. 
In the end, it was impossible for them to go on 
resisting, so Tom Ireeuw, Konstant Ruhukail, the Afoor 
fcrnily and others were forced onto planes by police. They 
argued strenuously but in the end they were forced to go. 
What happened in Blackwater after the move? 
Not long afterwards, many refugees were repatriated. 
The authorities seemed to be determined to cut the 
refugees off from contact with people outside, and 
prevent them from sending out any reports. 
Were the 12 who were deported in October from Telefomin? 
Yes. They were told they were being taken to Vanimo but 
that was a lie. They were sent back to Jayapura. 
How do you feel about Bernard Narokobi 's efforts on 
behalf of the refugees? 
He's doing what he can based on the laws of PNG. But a 
court decision in favour of the refugees could have 
brought down the government because it would ·have meant 
that the government violated its own laws. I testified in 
court, and my statement was published in the press. But 
they kept postponing the verdict. We thought the case 
would be cancelled altogether. 
The PNG court judgement 
The judgement was announced last month. The Australian 
judge threw out all the complaints and rejected all the 
evidence of the refugees. 
I didn't know that. Several of us testified. I told the 
court my husband had been murdered, that we fled because 
our fundamental rights were being violated. Tom and the 
others told the court the refugees were not free to move 
about to seek their own livelihoods, that the police and 
local officials treated the refugees badly, were rude 
towards the young girls, beat them up and so on. The food 
rations were cut from time to time. They mentioned 
reports from Jayapura that returned refugees hod been 
poisoned and some had died. The purpose of Bernard's case 
was to demand protection for the refugees' rights. 
But the judge said there should have been more 
submissions from refugees. Narokobi said this would have 
been too expensive. The ones who appeared represented aU 
the others. The court refused to accept this. The 
government did not pay our fares to Port Moresby which 
are very high. Finding accommodation in Port Moresby 
isn't easy either. 
Who else besides Bernard helps the refugees in PNG? 
The Church and the missionaries. The ordinary people 
often protest about this or that but the government never 
listens. 
Did anyone apply for re-settlement in Australia? 
Yes, a lot of us were given application forms, mainly 
Fefugees 
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the students, government employees, those who felt they 
could settle down quickly in Australia, who knew some 
English and so on. I completed a form. Those who were 
heavily involved politically and who might be in danger 
if they remain in PNG were asked to apply. We sent in the 
forms ages ago, early in 1985, but nothing ever happened. 
What do the refugees want? Who do they thiri< should help? 
They look first and foremost to the Dutch government 
which is primarily responsible for what happened to our 
people. it's as if the problem now rests with PNG and 
Australia while the Dutch government shows no interest. 
Why so many West Papuans left for PNG 
It's generally thought that most refugees come from the 
border areas, but I've been told the people who arrived 
in Bewani recently cane from far away. Is that true? 
For people who live in the interior, it's not difficult 
to cross mountains and walk long distances. Many people 
will do anything to get to PNG because they are under so 
much pressure in their villages, from Affil operations and 
from Army atrocities. People are very afraid, and only 
want to go to PNG. 
Why has the move to leave intensified recently? 
Because of widespread military operations in many parts 
of the country. There was a Hasanuddin Operation by 
troops from South Sulawesi who were extremely brutal. 
Soldiers training in Jayapura. [Phot.o: 
They operated in many remot·e areas, in the villages. This 
was going on while I was still in West Papua. 
People regarded two Army units as being particularly 
brutal, the Kopassandha [now Kopassus, the paracorrmando] 
troops and troops of the Hasunuddin South Sulawesi 
division. They held large-scale operations throughout the 
interior at the end of 1983. People were terrified. No-
one felt safe at night in their homes or travelling 
anywhere. So more and more people decided to try and 
leave the country. In this way too, people outside will 
know what is going on. 
Transmigration 
Has tran911igrat ion been a factor in driving people away? 
What do Papuans thiri< about transmigration? 
Foreign Minister Dr. Mochtar says transmigration will 
help our people develop, that the purpose is to teach our 
people how to till the soil, how to grow food and so on. 
But that's not true. If that's the objective, why do all 
the transmigrants come from Java? Why not from Kalimantan 
or Ambon or places like that? People from these regions 
know the Milay language well and can communicate with us 
Papuans, not like the Javanese transmigrants. They hardly 
known any Malay at all, so how are they supposed to teach 
Papuans anything? Amorig our own people, everyone speaks 
Malay, or Bahasa Indonesia. They may be illiterate but 
they all speak Indonesian. 
Then, there's the question of land. If the progrcrrrne is 
intended to help the Papuans, why is all the fertile land 
given to the transmigrants while our people are forced to 
moved off their fertile land and live in much less 
fertile areas where they can't make a living? 
Papuan traditions and culture make it difficult for 
them to accept being driven off their land and told to go 
and live somewhere else. By tradition, our people are 
tied to their land which cannot be given away. But now 
this is happening all the time. For example, people who 
were living along the coast of Jayapura were forced to 
move to Holtekang or Skou. They moved when they were told 
to, but after some time, they couldn't stand it and 
drifted back. Such policies are unacceptable to our 
people. 
Transmigration is putting people under a lot of 
pressure. If this goes on, the Papuan people will simply 
disappear. Already, Indonesians are beginning to 
outnumber the Papuans. There are more Indonesian children 
in the schools than Papuans, for instance. 
All these factors have played a part. 
Indonesian officials rejected 
What happened when the Indonesian verification team 
visited Blackwater c~ in November 1984? 
The PNG officials had told us an Indonesian team would 
be caning, and asked whether we would receive them at the 
camp. Through our Refugee Corrmittee, we said we didn't 
want to receive any delegation from Indonesia. Before 
they came, we were asked to send a group of people to 
Vanimo for a meeting, we thought, with PNG officials. So 
we chose a group, but when they arrived in Vanimo and 
discovered that they were expected to meet Indonesians, 
they got very angry at having been tricked. So they came 
strai_ght back to carrp to decide what to do. Earlier that 
morning people from the PNG intelligence had come to tell 
us the Indonesian team would be coming anyway, so we drew 
up a statement declaring that if they came, whatever 
happened would be the responsibility of the PNG 
authorities. 
When the Indonesian delegation arrived, there was a 
huge demonstration from our side. I joined in, and held 
up a photo of my husband. Some of the other refugees 
seized my children and held them up high, saying "Where 
is their father?' 
Then the deputy-governor spoke, saying we should all go 
back to Jayapura. While he was speaking, we all wanted to 
put questions, but they said questions should wait till 
after the deputy-governor's speech .. When he finished, 
many refugees said I should be the first to speak. But as 
I was asking my questions, the Indonesians turned and 
started to leave. It was this that really infuriated the 
refugees, provoking such anger that the police lost 
control. They started throwing tear-gas bombs at us but 
some of the refugees grabbed the bombs and threw them 
back at the police. Then refugees started attacking the 
Indonesians. Some were injured and were treated in 
hospital. The fault for the incident rests with the PNG 
authorities and with the Indonesians for behaving so 
arrogantly. 
What did the Indonesians say? 
That we needn't be afraid and should go bock. They 
appealed to our "national consciousness". But we felt we 
had every reason to be afraid because of what had 
happened to Arnold and Eddu. That's why the refugees 
wonted me to be the first to speak. 
The lrian Jaye Church 
The church of Irion Jayo (O<I) recently decided to send a 
delegation to meet the refugees. What's your opinion? 
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That wouldn't be the first time they've tried to do 
that. In 1984, before the Indonesian verification team 
visited Blackwater, a church team come, two ministers, 
both Papuans. 6Jt we didn't want to meet them either. We 
weren't willing to meet anyone from Indonesia, including 
Popuans. The government uses the church for political 
objectives. We feel that the G<I should not be coming to 
speak with the Papuan. refugees but should be talking to 
Popuans in jail back home, doing something to help the 
oppressed people there. Over in PNG, Popuans are free 
from pressure and intimidation, they have no reason to 
fear they will be bumped off. So, why should the church 
send a mission there? 
Of course there are rank-ond-f ile church members who 
know what's going on and try to do something, and some 
ministers as well, but they ore afraid to speak out. 
What about the ministers who visited Arnold in jail? 
That was just a special dispensation, and only while he 
was held at Kodak [police headquarters]. They couldn't 
visit other prisoners. And in any case, after giving my 
husband some privileges, the Indonesian authorities 
killed him in the end. So you see, all this nice 
treatment was just a trick. But other prisoners were all 
badly t reated, beaten, tortured with electricity, forced 
to stay in water cells for long periods of time. 
The Indonesians accused Arnold of publishing an 'illegal' 
bulletin, Fajar Merdeka. ls that true? 
l never saw my husband do anything like this. He was 
al ways very busy with his work, his research' into folk 
culture and also helping translate the Bible into Biaki. 
He certainly wasn't involved in putting out a publication 
like that. I never saw such a bulletin, ana never neord 
him speak about it. It was just a false accusation to 
frame him. 
He didn't hide his sympathy towards the OPM, but there 
was never any proof that he was directly involved in it. 
In fact, he sometimes helped the authorities. For 
instance, when troops go out on operations, they often 
have difficulty making contact with people. So, Arnold 
sometimes gave them tapes of his Mambesak music to 
attract the people •.• 
What do people feel about that attempted uprising in 
Jayapura in February 1984-? 
l wasn't in Jayapura then, but the ex soldiers said the 
Army hod decided to send local troops to fight in East 
Timor, all the Papuan troops. So they thought, rather 
than be killed in another country, they should figh t in 
their own land. So the movement was launched, under the 
leadership of several Papuans in the Army - Prawor, Awom 
and others. The initiative was token by Popuans in the 
Army, but it quickly got the support of students, school 
children and many others. Their pent-up frustrations were 
quickly aroused. As soon as news of the action spread, 
many others rose up, then fled to PNG. And since then, 
many hove left the comps to join the fighters in the 
bush. 
You've said you don't thiii< women should join the 
guerrilla struggle. Why? 
You should realise that conditions in the jungle ore 
very difficult, and women aren't able to cope. It's not 
easy to wage the struggle if there ore women in the 
movement. The Perrka [Jacob Prai OPM wing] people take 
their women and children to the bush. The result is that 
during operations against the guerri llos, many more 
people are killed than if only men were in the bush. 
Are there rules prohibiting the refugees from leaving the 
COll>S? 
Yes. People ore only allowed to go to Vonimo once a 
week. for shopping. There are only two trucks with space 
for at most twenty refugees. 
How many would you say there are now at Blackwater? 
Probably not more than about 600 - including children. 
Some have been repatriated. Some were transferred to 
other camps, like Bewani, and lots of the men went into 
the bush. The families of men who have gone into the bush 
stayed behind in the refugee camp. These are more likely 
to agree to go back to Jayapura. Of course many of the 
people came to Vanimo by foot, not by sea. The people 
from Waris came this way. They crossed over to Bewani, 
then came down into Vanimo. These were the ones who 
agreed to go bock home. They wanted to return by foot, as 
they had come, but the Indonesians made them go back by 
sea. That's why the demonstrations were so big. 
Protest against forced deportations 
When the demonstration took place in Vonimo ofter the 
12 men were deported [in October 19851 people in the 
town were taken completely by surprise. When people at 
the camp first heard about the deportations, they went to 
check the news in Vanimo first, but everything was 
closed. So they went to the airport, and there, they 
found only the wives whose husbands hod been deported, 
crying. Everyone became very angry, and started attacking 
anything around, cars for instance, breaking the windows. 
They went to various off ices to ask for info1marion, but 
no-one was to be found, so they just started ortacking 
everything. When they went bock to Vonimo, they found a 
truck, told the driver to get out, and the young refugees 
got on the truck and drove into the town. They took off 
their shirts, as if getting themselves ready for a fight, 
and started throwing things everywhere. One of them 
opporently had a home-made bomb but it didn't go off. 
The police could not cope and called in the PNG army 
(Defence Force). People in Vanimo were really afraid, and 
everyone stayed inside because there was so much 
corrrnotion in the town. The refugees were careering all 
over the place, shouting slogans, giving vent to their 
anger. Some shouted in pidjin, some in Indonesian. 
Eventually, all the men returned to comp, and next 
morning, the police arrived. They surrounded the comp, 
rounded up the men and took them to Vonimo where they 
were detained, more than a hundred of them. This gives 
you some idea how many were at Blackwater at the time. 
This figure only includes heads-of-families, the ones who 
were rounded up by the police that morning. It doesn't 
include members of their families, and a large number of 
teenagers, boys and girls. 
The detention facilities in Vanimo were not big enough 
to accorrrnodate the men. They were sleeping in corridors, 
everywhere, in the forecourt of the police statio·r:i. The 
kampung people in Vanimo collected money to bail the men 
out, 50 kina for each detainee. 
children a a c~..,s=c,.,.h..,.00.,..... • .__ _______ ___. 
So there must be many children in the camps. Is there a 
school? 
There are hundreds of children and quite a lot at 
least 60, were born there. The camp school is named dfter 
Arnold, the Arnold Ap Memorial School. 
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ABRI Masuk Desa: 
Creating a superior breed 
For the sixth year in succession, the Armed Forces (ABRI) 
have undertaken an A BRI Masuk. Desa (AMD - ABRI Enters the 
Villages) campaign. The programme began in 198u and it 
has now become a regular feature for troops to go into 
villages several times a year to perform special duties. 
Each of the ten Kodams (territorial military corrmands) 
selects tasks such as road and bridge building or village 
improvement like erecting village halls, ci vii defence 
posts and public lavatories. Officers also join in the 
programme for so-called 'non-physical' activities, giving 
lectures on citizenship, fighting in defence of the 
state, the meaning of social welfare and the importance 
of notional security and order. 
Alongside the AMD campaign, the military have more 
recently taken other activities under their wing in the 
so-called 'Manunggal' or 'at-one-with' programmes: AEHI 
Monunggol Reboisosi (ABRI at-one-with reforestation}, 
ABRI Monunggol Keluargo Berencono (ABRI at-one-with the 
family plonni ng programme) and ABRI Monunggal 
Tronsmigrosi (ABRI at-one-with transmigration). Such 
activities involve a sizable number of troops. During the 
main 1985 AMO campaign, Army chief-of-staff General 
Rudini who was in charge of the operation, said 1,117 
units comprising 167,550 members of ABRI (or more than a 
third of all ABRI personnel) were involved. Activities 
were undertaken in some 3,000 villages throughout the 
country in oil 27 provinces (East Timor being the '27th 
province'). He denied complaints that the prograrrrne 
imposed a tinonciol burden on the provincial governments 
or on the villages 'assisted' by the troops, asserting 
that costs ore covered entirely by ABRl's own budget. 
Jakarta military conmcmder, Major-General Sugito 
inspects the work of his men, during the AWD campaigl'\ 
[Jakarta Post, 19 February 1986] 
Funding AMD and Manunggal Projects 
During the first five years of its existence, AMD cost 
over $7 million to run, not including expences for the 
troops. The expansion into Monunggol projects, such as 
the one•yeor stint preparing a transmigration site in 
South Sulawesi [see separate item], must be · adding 
enormoosly to the costs. 
Like other sectors of the economy, ABRI's allocation 
under the 1986/87 state budget for development announced 
in January was cut by more than 22 percent because of 
falling revenues from petroleum. Further cuts ore likely 
because the budget was based on a petroleum price of $25 
a barrel while the actual price hos since fallen by about 
half. 
But ABRI does not rely only on the state budget for its 
funds and is in on advantageous position to ride the 
current economic crisis. It hos a huge "unweildy but 
secretive business empire of its own, the assets of which 
run into billions of dollars" {Finonciol Times, 19 
February 1986]. Acco~ding to the some source, ABRI 
companies generate additional funds for the military 
establishment equivalent to "between 30 to 50 per cent of 
the defence budget of $2.27 billion". 
The largest holding company in this empire is tne 
Army's Tri Usaha Bokti which engages in a wide range of 
business operations and provides funding for many aspects 
of ABRl's activities. lt funds the purchase of aircraft 
and other equipment now being acquired to professionalise 
the military establishment. It odds substantially to the 
meagre official salaries of officers (a general earns 
less than $500 a month, a colonel a mere $225). It 
invests in housing for the troops and demobilised 
soldiers and finances important prestige projects such as 
AMO. 
Corrpeting with the civilian sector 
There is no doubt that AMO and the Manunggal projects 
have caused considerable disquiet in the business sector 
because the kind of work undertaken is normally given out 
to contractors. General Rudini hos responded to the 
criticism by asserting that ACRI projects are located in 
remote areas not suitable or attractive to private 
contractors. Such claims must sound particularly hollow 
today when budget retrenchment seriously threatens the 
business prospects of some 13,000 contractor firms in 
Indonesia who depend almost entirely on government 
contracts. 
With so many industries sacking their workers and 
unemployment increasing in the countryside, these Affil 
projects are also robbing the unemployed of job 
opportunities. At the same time, when troops descend on a 
village, the villagers have no alternative but to join in 
the work as gotong-royong (mutual aid) support 
brigades ... without pay, of course. . 
In any case, the results of AMO for the population are 
marginal because much of the construction work undertaken 
quickly falls into disrepair through lack of maintenance 
and regular use, a complaint made recently by the West 
Java military commander, Major-General R.I. Siregar. 
[Kompos, 7 February] 
The ideological thrust of AMO 
In fact, the AMO and Manunggal projects should not be 
considered according to technical criteria or funding. 
The proclaimed objective of improving conditions for 
villagers is far less important than the ideological 
thrust which General Benny Murdani hos defined as being 
to "instill a spirit of struggle among Affil personnel, 
making them conscious of why ABRI exists and who it is 
intended to serve" [~s, 24 March 1984). 
A number of statements by military leaders have made it 
clear that the programme is aimed at providing the newer 
generation of soldiers with justification for their claim 
to being the country's elite, the pre-destined leaders of 
the nation. The earlier generation of troops rested their 
claims to elite status as the '1945 generation' who 
fought for independence. General Suharto and General Moh. 
Yusuf (originator of the AMO prograrrme) wanted to md<e 
sure that the missionary zeal and vanguard role of the 
Arrred Forces would be sustained as a new generation of 
soldiers with no claim to the '1945 spirit' took over. 
The essential idea was, and still is, that in the 
process of mingling with villagers, the leading role of 
the Armed Forces would be enhanced throughout the 
community, affecting the outlook of both troops and the 
common people. The Jakarta military carrnander, Major-
General Soegito launched this year's AMD ccrnpaign with 
the words: "ABRI as the stabiliser [stabilisator] and 
vanguard ot society must at the some time set an ~xomple 
for the rest of the population to follow." [Kompos, 71 
February] 
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TRANSMIGRATION 
Military moves to bolster transmigration programme 
Late lost year, Army troops moved in force to take 
control of security at a transmigration site in Donggolo, 
Central Sulawesi. The Sulawesi military command announced 
that troops would remain on the site for two months, 
busying themselves building roads and bridges whilst 
indoctrinating the transmigrants about their defence and 
security obligations. This was the first in a series of 
operations which the Armed Forces have code-named 'A BRI 
Mitnunggal Transmigrasi' (The Armed Forces at one with 
Transmigration) Ll<cmpas, 1 November 1985J. 
A few weeks later, troops of the same command commenced 
a one-year assignment to prepare a new transmigration 
site in South Sulawesi during which they will clear 750 
hectares of land, build 500 houses and construct roads 
and bridges. The operation was launched in the full glare 
of publicity with Armed Forces commander-in-chief, 
General Benny Murdani marching at the head of the 
contingent of soldiers, flanked by Major-General Nana 
Narundana, Sulawesi military commander, and many senior 
officers from the central high command. 
These two events mark a significant rise in the level 
of military involvement in transmigration at a time when 
the programme is coming under increased criticism at home 
and abroad. But it is not unexpected. Just one year ago, 
General Murdani referred to transmigration as "the only 
programme in the economic field that must quite 
categorically be tied in with defence and security 
considerations". Furthermore, he said that site 
preparation and the removal of obstacles to land 
availability must have special focus because "the choice 
of locations is related to the concept of territorial 
management in the regions" which explains why the Armed 
Forces ''must be involved at the earliest possible stage 
in selecting the sites" [Sinor l-larapan, 5 March, 1985, 
quoted in TAPOL Bulletin, No 68, March 1985]. 
Unrest in Donggala 
The Donggala site chosen for the first Manunggdl 
operation was the scene ot serious disturbances last July 
when a transmigrant was killed in a fight with local 
inhabitants after he was caught stealing coconuts from a 
garden owned by local villagers. In retaliation, 
transmigrants attacked the homes of local villagers and 
burnt down 27 houses. The incident drew attention to the 
impoverished condition of thousands of transmigrant 
families in Donggala, unable to survive once subsistence 
rations provided by the government for the first year 
after arrival had been withdrawn [Sinor l-larapan, 2 July 
1985]. What the Indonesian press virtually ignored, 
however, was the impact of transmigration on the local 
population whose lands have been occupied by the project. 
Several days after the incident, the local authorities 
claimed that the transmigrants hod been "incited'' by 
former political prisoner(s) in their midst. A number of 
transmigrants were arrested, although whether they were 
ex-prisoners was not clear [Sinor l-larapan, 11 July 1985]. 
The Donggala incident sent journalists scurrying to the 
region to investigate, only to discover that Central 
Sulawesi which has been a major transmigration recipient 
region for years has been plagued with such incidents 
most of which "haven't be reported in the media in the 
interests of notional security". [Sinor l-larapan, 18 July 
1985] Severe lack of food has driven transmigrants to 
quit the site in search of jobs or to raid the gardens 
and cattle of local people. s·ome 17,000 people 
transmigrated to the area from Java four years ago but 
are still unable to produce food crops because of the 
unsuitability of the soil. [.aorta Post, 20 July 1985] 
A transmigrant from Java surveys her new home, 
a newly-cleared site near Rimbo Biyung in 
Sumatra. [P/Jota: Jerome Ricardou] 
On one occasion, groups of settlers descended o.n the 
sub-district capital of Bunta and looted the food shops 
in the face of local resistance, while on another 
occasion, a local transmigration official was killed by 
transmigrants driven to despair by callous neglect of 
their needs [Sinor l-larapan, 18 July 1985]. 
PKI witch-hunt paves the way for tighter security 
measures 
The unsubstantiated claim that former political 
prisoners provoked the trouble in Donggala was followed a 
few months later by a series of reports alleging that ex-
prisoners have been the source of security problems on 
many transmigration sites throughout the country. In 
fact, the authorities even claimed that 426,498 heads of 
families on the sites are "ex-prisoners" or "ex-A<J", 
with a total of 1,759,492 family members spread across 
183 sites in 20 different provinces [Wospada, 30 
Septermerand Suara Merdeka, 1 October 1985]. (When the 
family-head is said to be "ex-PKI", the entire family is 
automatically branded in the same way.) Since the total 
number of families officially said to have been resettled 
under the transmigration programme in the past 15 years 
amounts to 737,707, government statements imply that "ex-
prisoners" account for no less than 60 percent of the 
total. 
In Lampung, South Sumatra, a major transmigration 
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region since early this century, the military authorities 
said security had been tightened after it was discovered 
that some "ex-PKI" heads of family had disappeared, while 
others hod "slipped in" to the region without permission 
from their area of origin. The South Sumatra military 
commander, Major-General Siswadi said there are 60,000 
"ex-PKI" heads of family in Lampung, but when asked how 
many had "disappeared" or "slipped in without 
permission", he said: "I cant remember though they 
clearly exist" [~s, 5 October, 1986]. 
To draw attention to the imagined security threat posed 
by these political outcasts, the military authorities 
have since announced that "ex-prisoners" will no longer 
be permitted to transmigrate, and have issued 
instructions to the regional military comTiands to step up 
surveillance and control of transmigration sites. This 
explains the background to the Army's 'Manunggal' 
operation and the recent move into the Donggala site. 
Army involvement in site selection 
The decision to use troops to prepare transmigration 
sites is directly related to the statement by General 
Murdani last March linking the prograrrrne to defence and 
security. The move is based on an instruction issued last 
October to the Army by President Suharto to become 
actively involved in the choice and preparation of sites 
[Kompos, 6 January 1986). 
This comes at a time when many people inside the 
bureaucracy are full of misgivings about the suitability 
of the prograrrrne. In fact, late last year, a team of 
bureaucrats from three government departments - forestry, 
environment, population and development, and the interior 
- together with forestry experts from the London-based 
International Institute for Environment and Development, 
produced a Forest Review which makes some devastating 
criticisms about the effect of transmigration on tropical 
forests. 
Given the current objectives and operational procedures 
of the Transmigration Prograrrrne, the Team considers 
Transmigration as the single sectoral activity with the 
greatest potential to advance forest destruct ion -
often to no constructive result. Whether a 'success' or 
'failure' by present standards, Transmigration as 
currently managed can only have negative implicottons 
for forest resources.[See A Review of Policies 
Affecting Sustainable Development of Forest Lands in 
Indonesia, 1985, Volume II, page 62.) 
A detailed environmental, social and political analysis 
of Transmigration is to be published in the May issue of 
The Ecologist, produced in collaboration with Survival 
International and TAPOL. [Copies will be available to 
TAPOL readers at a reduced price.] An article by Charles 
Secrett of Friends of the Earth, London, discusses the 
disastrous effects of Transmigration on Indonesia's rain 
forests, quoting at length from the above-mentioned 
Forest Review. Another article, from TAPOL, analyses the 
military component of the prograrrrne, in particular the 
extension of the Army's doctrine of. 'territorial 
management' through population control in the islands now 
torgetted for a major influx of tronsmigronts. 
Worry about foreign criticism 
The transmigration authorities are very worried about 
international criticism of the programme, fearing in 
particular that this could influence funding from the 
World Bank and other foreign sources. Transmigration 
Minister, Mortono, has recently referred frequently to an 
organised campaign originating, he claims, from Amnesty 
International, and alleges that he has received 87 
letters of protest "from parliaments, governments, non-
governmental organisations and non-governmental 
international organisations" [see Editorial in Sinor 
Horapon, 29 January 1986]. It is, as anyone knows, quite 
inconceivable that Amnesty would address the issue of 
transmigration nor is TAPOL aware of any document issued 
by Amnesty on the question. By lashing out at imagined 
opponents, Mortono may be hoping to forestall the 
campaign about to be launched by environmental and human 
rights organisations as announced in the last TAPOL 
Bulletin. 
Indonesian academics hove also come in for rebuke. 
Martono accused (unnamed) academics of having misused 
"science-for-science-sake research" by disseminating it 
to the public whereas such research should only be 
confined to the campus, "because such lack of control 
from academics results in putting (transmigration) in a 
negative light". These academics, he went on, were 
behaving as if they support the opinions of experts 
abroad "who are clearly antagonistic towards us" 
[Kedaulatan Rakyat, 17 January 1986]. 
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In memoriam 
Just as the year was drawing to a close, on a day when 
rain fell without stop, the gloomy atmosphere grew even 
darker with the news that Comrade Soeprapto hod passed 
away in Cikini Hospital, Jakarta, on 30 December 1985, in 
his seventy-second year. 
Better known to his comrades as Prapto Cokil, he never 
regained his health ofter returning home from the Buru 
Island concentration camp in 1977. The torture and 
sufferings he experienced during his years of 
incarceration from 1967 to 1977 gravely undermined his 
health. He lived through the twilight of his life without 
on income, always ill with some ailment or another. Like 
so many other honest, loyal fighters, he died in 
miserable circumstances. But poverty and physical 
decline never made him lose hope. He remained in high 
spirits to the lost. Whenever the discussion turned to 
upholding aspirations and liberating the people from 
backwardness and impoverishment, Bung Propto always spoke 
with spirit and enthusiasm. 
He was one of tens of thousands of forgotten, discorded 
people who hod mode his own personal contribution to the 
independence struggle. In the early years of the 
Indonesian republic, he was secretary of the Ministry of 
Defence from 1946 to 1948, then became a member of the 
Central Indonesian Notional Committee (KNIP) - forerunner 
of the Indonesian Parliament. From 1950 till 1965, he was 
secretory general of Bokuna, the Notional Coordination 
Body of Businessmen. 
Bung Prapto was born in S impel, South Sumatra in 1913, 
and graduated from high school (HBS) in Jakarta in 1935. 
After leaving school, he worked at the Department of 
economic Affairs from 1936 to 1937 and it was here that 
he met and established a close professional and personal 
relationship with Amir Sjarifuddin (Information, then 
Defence, Minister in the governments of Sjahrir from 1945 
to 1947, and Prime Minister from 1947-48). Although they 
worked together in the some office for only a short 
period, their political collaboration continued right up 
to the time of Amir's murder by the Indonesian Army in 
December 1948. 
It is greatly to be regretted that Bung Prapto never 
hod the chance to write his memoirs. His close ties with 
Amir, and his experience as secretary of the Defence 
Ministry in the early years of the Republic, made him a 
'Cleanliness' 
The following is a round-up of the latest developments in 
the on-going anti-communist witch-hunt: 
Army major dismissed 
An army major, identified only by his initials SS, has 
been dishonorably dismissed after it was discovered that 
The major's dishonorable dismissal is the occasion for a 
ceremony. [Tempo, 8 March 1986] 
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Supropto (right} being interviewed, with Pranoedya 
(left}, in Buru. [The Asia Hagazine, 5 Harch 1972] 
person with intimate knowledge of Indonesian affairs in 
those crucial days. It is also a matter for great regret 
that Amir never wrote his autobiography. (One account of 
Amir's life written by Frederiek Djara Wellem, and 
published by Sinor Horapon Publishing House, Jakarta, in 
1984, was immediately banned.) 
He leaves a wife and seven children, five sons and two 
daughters. 
He died, toking with him his memories, his loves and 
his unfulfilled feelings of revenge. But he did bequeath 
to us his struggle experiences, and his noble desire to 
build a just and prosperous society, a socialist society 
free from the exploitation of one person by another. 
Farewell, dear Comrade, and may you rest in peace. The 
struggle never dies; it lives on as port of history. 
From our special correspondent in Jakarta.. 
a la Pancasila 
he had been a member of a banned organi~ation. [Although 
no-one bothered to make the point, whatever the 
organisation in question, the man's alleged membership 
certainly dates back to the time when it was still 
legal.] 
The dismissal was marked by a ceremony at which Mojor-
General D. Soetarto, comnander of the Udayana military 
command based in Den Poser, Bali, announced that the 
major's post links with the "PKl/G30S" hod been 
discovered when he was still commander of a district 
military corrrnond. The team investigating his background 
had come to the conclusion that he must be classified as 
'B2 category', the category which in the years following 
1965 automatically meant long-term detention without 
trial. 
The Udoyona military corrrnander used the occasion to 
reiterate that the Army is constantly engaged in 
"intensive clean-up operations of the latent corrrnunist 
danger within its own rari<s". Ex-Major SS was being 
dismissed "even though he hod since served the state 
loyally and well" ( Berito Buono, 21 February]. 
The 'clean background' criterion 
A new expression has now crept in to the witch-hunting 
vocabulary. 'Bersih lingkungan' could be translated as 'a 
Please turn t.a the bacl< page 
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'Opening up' Pancasila for all 
From our own correspondent in Jakarta 
With all tl-e backing of executive power and the force of 
the law, every Indonesian social-political group, every 
single Indonesian citizen without exception, is now 
prohibited from having any beliefs other than the 
Pancasila. No longer is communism the only ideology to 
have been declared illegal. All other ideologies, social-
democracy, Islam and Christianity, are now outside the 
law as well. 
Genuine Muslims realise only too well that the decision 
to establish Pancasila as the sole ideology is intended 
to destroy Islam as a political force. It is no surprise 
therefore that the Muslims are fighting so hard to oppose 
the 'sole-ideology' law enacted last year. 
Nationalists who adopted the teachings of Sukarno - his 
concept of Marhaenism, including Pancasila - regarded 
Pancasila as something superior to other 'isms' precisely 
because it upheld the idea of Bhinel<a Tunggal lka (Unity 
in Diversity). In other words, it sought to preserve the 
co-existence of various ideologies, in the interests of 
national harmony. It did not aim at coercion. It was 
Sukarno's purpose not to use force but to invite "the 
whole family to eat together at the same table". 
There's a world of difference between inviting and 
forcing people to do something. Forcing total compliance 
with a single ideology is the antithesis of democracy. 
Such ideological frameworks as socialism, nationalism and 
religion are a living reality in Indonesian society, and 
they cannot be stamped out with the use of force. 
Attempts to eliminate the accommodative spirit of the 
Pancasilo can only fuel national resistance, giving the 
stimulus to political unrest and violence, which is what 
the government says it is trying to prevent. 
The government claims that the 'sole- ideology' 
doctrine, which it has imposed upon the country, will 
prevent people being compartmentalised under different 
ideological headings, in conflict with each other. 
Ten million Golkor cadres 
Pancasila is proclaimed as an ideology that is 'open to 
all'. and in order to make it so, Golkar has flung 
itself into a 'caderisation' campaign to train ten 
Muslim students cadre course closed 
down by troops 
Troops broke into the Jogjakarta office of the Muslim 
students organisation, the HMI [Hi"l>unon Mahosiswo Islan] 
in the middle of the night, dragged the occupants out of 
their beds and ordering them all to disperse immediately. 
They were attending a 4-day course to train cadres. A 
dozen or so soldiers armed with M- 16 weapons, together 
with five policemen ordered all the male students to 
gather up their belongings and leave the building, while 
the women stvdents were forced to take shelter in a small 
prayer-house on the premises. 
The local mili tory command claims that the course was 
"illegal" because the organisers did not have a permit. 
Cadre courses like this are a regular occurrence in the 
HMI. The curriculum follows a standard pattern. The 
course material hos been used many times before without 
difficulty. One organiser said that applying for a permit 
means getting the approval of no fewer than 19 officials, 
so they have lost patience with the procedure. ''Even 
though we hold this course fifty times, using exactly the 
same material, we still hove to apply for a permit every 
single time," he said. 
The police chief alleged he hod not been informed of 
the mater iol to be used, and said it was "very easy" to 
obtain a permit. He denied that the break up of the 
course had anything to do with the 1987 general 
elections. "The situation here is calm. We're only 
million Golkar cadres in villages throughout the length 
and breadth of the country. The programme is called 'The 
Education and Training of Village-Level Territorial 
Motivators [Pendidil<an dan Latihan Pcnggeral< Teritoria.l 
Tingkat Desa]. Everyone must JO!n in, along with 
government off iciols - youth, women. teachers, peasants 
and workers. Everyone is required to accept a common 
understanding of Poncosilo. 
Is such openness and common understanding achievable by 
means of Golkor's mighty bandwagon? Golkor is the only 
political force able to launch such a movement. The non-
Golkar social-political forces are incapable of having 
their own 'caderisation' movements. The man or woman in 
the street knows very well that all talk about openness 
in political life is just a slogan to whitewash the 
regime. 
Even wit"hin Golkar, the chances of openness are 
illusory. Why was it, for example, that Ismail Suko, a 
local man and a civilian, was forced to withdraw his 
candidacy as governor ofRiou even though he won majority 
support in the Riou provincial assembly? How come that in 
his stead, a Javanese general, Imam Munandor, was foisted 
on the province? Why is it impossible for anyone who is 
not a member of Golkar to get a seat in the cabinet? Why 
must all government employees be Golkar members? There 
are a thousand and one examples to prove that openness 
and corrmon understanding are simply slogans promoting the 
interests of a certain group, and are far removed from 
promoting corrmon interests. 
The last thing we con expect from the government is 
openness. Why is it never open about the budget of the 
state oil company, Perlamina? Why are economic policies 
adopted without any consultation with the Legislative 
Assembly, even though the Assembly is firmly under 
government control? 
For how much longer can the pretence about 'openness' 
and 'togetherness' be maintained? Only for as long as the 
deep-rooted phobias and traumas in society have not been 
cast aside. Only then will the forces of democracy find 
their feet again and invite "the whole family to eat 
together at the some table". 
Appointing the general who lost the election as governor! 
[Kompas, 11 September 1985] 
keeping a close watch and preserving our vigilance." 
[Tempo, 22 February 1986) 
The move against the Jogjakarta HMI may be on indirect 
response to the dispute between this branch and the 
notional organisation which is convening a congress 
shortly to adopt Poncasila as its sole ideology. The 
.Jogjo branch has declared its intention not to attend. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS 
A cover-up from Washington 
Since the early 1970s, the US government has been required by law to mci<e a yearly report to Congress on human rights 
practices in all countries which receive US economic and military assistance. For a country like Indonesia, State 
Department officials have perfected a method of drawing together a few truths and half-truths while ignoring major 
violations. The result is a chapter 1) which can only be described as a deliberate cover-up of repression perpetrated on 
a grand scale. 
The Tanjung Priok subversion trials 
The most devastating admission in this year's report 
comes under the heading 'Denial of Fair Public Trial' 
where the report refers to "stiff sentences" passed in 
the many subversion trials during 1985. It admits that 
"there may be several hundred" people serving sentences 
for subversion, and accepts that "in all such security-
related cases, it is widely believed that the Government 
will ensure conviction irrespective of the evidence 
presented in court'' (page 775, emphasis added). Elsewhere 
under the heading 'Disappearances', we learn that "an 
Indonesian Muslim social organisation developed a list of 
40 or more people who 'disappeared' during the 1984 
Tanjung Prick Riots and are presumed dead" (page 773). 
Yet the brief account of the Fatwa and Dharsono trials 
ignores the most crucial issue around which the charges 
revolved .. the White Paper (not once mentioned in the 
chapter) issued immediately after the Tanjung Priok 
Massacre calling for a public inquiry. Such an inquiry 
would have brought to light the true extent of the 
slaughter unleashed in Tanjung Priok. By refusing to 
countenance such an inquiry and passing down subversion 
convict ions against those who wanted one, the regime has 
safeguarded a gigantic cover-up of the most serious 
violation perpetrated by the Army in Indonesia since the 
anti-ccrnmunist masscres of the late 1960s. The State 
Deportment has condoned and reinforced this cover-up by 
its glib disregard for the information brought to light 
during the trials. 
Under the heading 'Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or 
Exile', the State Department recognises that Kopkamtib's 
powers of arrest "supercede" the protections guaranteed 
under Indonesia's Criminal Procedure Code (Kuhap) but 
claims that, "No cases of Kopkamtib exercising its 
extralegal powers were reported during 1985". This is 
simply not true. Anyone reading press reports of the 
trials will know that defence lawyers were able to prove 
repeatedly that the arrests made in the wci<e of the 
Tanjung Priok Massacre were carried out by troops using 
Kopkamtib powers, that detainees were interrogated and 
beaten up by troops, and many made false confessions, 
later retracted, under Army (ie Kopkamtib) pressure. 
Nor does the chapter even mention the Tanjung Priok 
detentions under the heading 'Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment'. Quite apart from 
the many claims by defendants that they were beaten up to 
get 'confessions' needed by the prosecution, how else 
than cruel, inhuman or degrading can one describe the 
Army's treatment of the dozens of badly injured victims 
of the massacre who were later charged and found guilty 
of assaulting the armed troops who shot them down in cold 
blood? 
Pancosilo as the sole ideology 
Uider the heading 'Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and 
Association', the State Department dilutes the most 
fundamental assault on this freedom by failing to state 
that the Societies Law enacted in 1985 requires all 
organisations to accept ~ancasila as their sole ideology. 
Are there other regimes anywhere in the world, even 
within the socialist bloc, that demand such total 
ideological conformity? 
The impact of such a totalitarian law on freedom of 
religion and freedom of speech is simply not discussed. 
The State Department draws attention to the ban on 
certain religious groups (Jehovah's Witnesses, the Saha' i 
faith and 13 'mystical sects' in North Sumatra) and 
states that "some animists in remote parts of Indonesia 
have reportedly been pressured to convert to Islam or 
Christianity" (page 779), But it glosses over the 
disruptive impact of the 'sole ideology' low on organised 
Muslim opinion, even claiming that ''missionary activities 
are relatively unimpeded". I-low to explain then the many 
stiff sentences passed against Muslim preachers simply 
because of sermons they have delivered? 
The State Department cannot be ignorant of the 
Kopkamtib cable of 27 July 1985 instructing all military 
commands to monitor and control preachers' sermons and 
'deal with' those who violate Kopkamt ib guidelines [See 
TAPOL Bulletin, No. 73, January 1986, page 16], In fact, 
many 1985 subversion trials were based on Kopkamtib 
intelligence monitoring of sermons. This proves that th~ 
1985 instruction merely formalised a system of Army 
Suharto with Reagan, in Washfngton, -in October 1982. 
[Washington Post, 13 October 1982] 
control that has been in operation since long before the 
Tanjung Prick Massacre. A number of Army and police·spies 
gave evidence about speeches they had been monitoring for 
months and helped to secure stiff sentences. Yet, the 
State Department thinks it can get away with denying that 
Kopkamtib has engaged in extralegal activity during 1985! 
West Papua 
As far as Washington is concerned, violations in West 
Papua can be dealt with in a single paragraph about the 
refugees in Papua New Guinea, "kept .•• from returning to 
their homeland (by) continued rebel allegations of 
Indonesian military reprisals against border crossers" 
(page 780). Not a word about the 12 refugees so brutally 
returned in handcuffs to Jayapura last October, and 
immediately taken into detention by the Army. This is not 
a 'rebel allegation' but a fact substantiated even in the 
Indonesian press. 
East Timor 
But it is on the question of East Timor that the State 
1) The Chapter on Indonesia in Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1985, February 1986. Prepared by the 
Department of State for the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives and the Corrmittee on . 
Foreign Relations of the US Senate. 
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Department surpasses itself in deception. There are 
brief, passing references to "restrictions on movement to 
and within East Timor" (page 779), "restrictions on 
meetings in East Timor" (page 778) and an admission that 
there were still 932 detainees oh Atauro Island in 
October last year {page 774), though these were strangely 
not included in the overall figure of 500 persons 
detained without trial "in AcE:h, East and Central Java, 
Irion Jayo and East Timor" given just a few lines earlier 
in the same paragraph. 
Apart from that, we are expected to believe that there 
were "no substantiated reports of political killings ... 
in East Timor". Yet, how can anything be substantiated to 
the. satisfacOon of Washington unless free and unfettered 
access is permitted? Nor does the chapter breathe a word 
about the most fundamental violation of all, against East 
Timor's right to seH-determination. But then, with US 
airq:aft assisting the Army's counter-insurgency campaign 
throughout Eost Timor where hundreds of thousands of 
Timorese are confined to strategic camps, it is hardly 
BOOK REVIEW 
Robin Osborne, Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerrilla 
Struggle in Irion Jayo, Allen,& Unwin, Sydney, 1985.* 
Indonesia's Secret War is required reading for anybody 
seeking a working knowledge of trouble spots in world 
affairs. It is a good readable account of the transfer of 
power in West New Guinea from Holland to Indonesia and 
the struggle· which has emerged there following the denial 
of the r·ig'ht of the indigenous people to self 
determination. It is a good readable account and much 
more. Each of the five chapters reads well as a self 
contained essay, each contains pieces of information 
which have not been assembled before so that the book 
will also be required reading for serious students. 
In · Chapter 1, Osborne tells the story of Dutch 
colonisation -then decolonisation in New Guinea and the 
claim by Indonesia, as successor state to that of the 
Netherlands East Indies, to sovereignty over West New 
Guinea. The focus is the form and context of the 1962 New 
York Agreement which provided for a transfer of power, 
under UN auspid~s, from Holland to Indonesia, subject to 
an act of self .. determination no later than 1969. 
In Chapters 2 and 3 Osborne fokes us from the heavily 
stage managed 'Act of Free Choice/ Act of No Choice' to 
the errergence of firstly opposition then the formation of 
the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka - Papuan Independence 
Organisation), the umbrella under which the resistance 
has organised and acted. The account of the guerrilla 
.struggle culminates in the 1984 flight of more than 
10,000 refugees into neighbouring Papua New Guinea. 
In the fourth chapter, the author explores the 
situation inside Irion Jayo, the Indonesian policies and 
actions wh.ich have continued to alienate the indigenous 
people, the mounting toll of military repression and 
settler colonialism by which Indonesia has sought to 
integrate Irion into Indonesia. 
Osborne worked in Papua New Guinea as a press secretary 
to Prirre M.inister Sir Julius C:hon, later for then Deputy 
Prime Minister (now Prime Minister) Paios Wingti. The 
final chapter focuses on Papua New Guinean policy in 
response to the spillover of the West Popuon struggle 
into PNG's territory, and into its domestic politics. 
Reading Osborne's book is frustrating. Its scope md<es 
it more comprehensive than Nonie Sharp's Rule of the 
Sword and TAPOL's Obliteration of a People, but while its 
chapters are admirably self contained, they are 
repetitious and they do not add up to a systematic 
chronological account. The frustration is further 
heightened by its closure at the end of 1984 so that now, 
the treatment of PNG's response to the refugee situation 
reads as unfortunately foreshortened. The task of 
producing the definiti~e account of the West Papuan 
surprising that the State Department is as equally 
committed as Jakarta to keeping a veil of secrecy over 
the true situation in East Timor. 
* * * * * 
Space does not permit us to deal with many other 
glaring deceptions in the State Department's report. 
Suffice it to say that if members of Congress thirk they 
can rely on such an account to judge Indonesian human 
rights practices, they should be speedily warne~ to check 
the facts elsewhere. No-one expects an honest appraisal 
from the Reagan Administration, but members of Congress 
should know better. Is it not time for Congress to 
consider undertaking the inquiry into the Tanjung Priok 
Massacre which Jakarta has refused to allow? This might 
restore some credibility to the US law which requires US 
aid programmes to be reviewed each year in the light .of a 
country's human rights performance. 
struggle has been brought that much closer but remains 
necessarily incomplete, for the struggle itself is 
incomplete. 
Where lies the end? 
Osborne looks towards West Papua as "an independen~ 
state or a province with considerably more autonomy than 
at present". These are alternatives whfch approximate 
each other only in that they both assume the survival of 
the West Papuan people rather than their disappearance, 
another conceivable end to the struggle. Twenty-three 
years have shown that the one other conceivable outcome, 
and that favoured by all close bystanders, namely 
peaceful absorption, was wishful thinking. Osborne looks 
to the survival of the West Papuan·~ and their eventual 
achievement of autonomy. How?· 
The OPM poses, according to. Osborne, "a far more 
serious challenge to Indonesian rule than many outsiders 
think, or the Jakarta government admits~" (p. xiv) A 
page later however, he suggests that a free West Papua 
would be more likely to errerge from "political pressure 
on Jakarta, rather than a mi Ii tary victory by OPM". These 
observations occur in the introduction; Osborne leaves 
the reader to conjure up possible scenarios whereby 
Jakarta is brought to concede West Papyan autonomy, 
concentrating in 'he, body of his own book on the sto.ry .so 
far. What we con conclude from the story so for is this: 
* West Popuons hove a well established sense of their 
own right to exist as a people and an understanding pf 
The second edition of TAPOL's well-received book is still 
available. Order your copy now. 
Price: £3.50 including postage - LK, Europe and overseas 
surface: 
£5.00 including postage - airmail worldwide. 
Special rates for bulk orders. 
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the betrayal of their right to self determination. 
" The idea of a state of West Papua exists as a symbol · 
of the identity of the people. 
" Indonesian colonial policies and repression of the 
right of West Papuans to express their identity continues 
to reinforce this identity and the will to resist. 
" While the capacity of West Papuans to organise a 
military struggle ago.inst the Indonesian occupation 
remains limited, the capacity of the Indonesian army and 
administration to stamp out the resistance and the idea 
of West Papua is also limited. 
So, what next? 
Jakarta can maintain its present policies or concede 
Continued from page 20 
clean environment' but for witch-hunting purposes, it 
means 'a clean background'. Anyone with parents, uncles 
or aunts or other near or not-so-near relatives who are 
or were (many are no doubt dead) allegedly "ex-PKl/GJOS", 
by defi.nition has an 'unclean background'. 
The 'bers ih lingkungan' criterion is being used 
particularly for newly-appointed governmentemployeeswho 
must prove not only that they themselves were never in 
any pro-communist organisation but that "their 
environment has no PKI smell about it, such as for 
instance an uncle or other near relative involved in that 
movement" [Korrf>as, 4 February]. 
The expre!?sion was first used, to our knowledge, during 
a discussion at a parliamentary commission last month 
when it was soi d tho t people who were 1 2 years or older 
in 1965 must still ·obtain a "PKl/G30S clearance 
certificate'.' when applying for a government job. !hose 
unde:r 12 are not required to do so. However, one member 
from North Sumatra said that he knew of the case of a 
person born after 1965 who had been given a job in. the 
civil service, only to be dismissed four months later 
when it was discovered that his. father was allegedly "ex-
PKJ". , [TAPOL Bulletin has monitored several cases like 
this in the past few issues,] 
A.E. Manihurukr chief of the State Personnel 
Administration Board was not too sure about the origins 
Censorship 
Responsibility for the conn'lission to examine and evaluote 
[Komis.i Pr.neliti da n Penildi} performances ptJt on by 
impressorios has been transferred from the Department of 
Education and Culture to Bakin, the State Intelligence 
Coordination Boord. The Minister of Education, Fuad 
Hctssa11, who announced this, explained 1·hat a new 
presidential edict is to be issued soon, regulating the 
supervision of all puhlic performances. Handing the 
cornni.ssior.1 over to Bakin in the interim reveals that the 
military are determined to reinforce their control over 
yel· another cirea of public octivity. 
The conrnission deals with a wide range of matters 
involving security, such as lhe activities of foreigners, 
censorship and the like, and it was now considered beyond 
the competence of the Education Department to handle such 
things. [Korrf>os Minggu, 16 1\forch] 
Javonology lecture called off 
People who turned up to a meeting of the Javanology 
Institute, the Yayasan Panunggalan, to hear a lecture on 
"The Javanese belief in spirits" in Jogjakarta, were 
disappointed to hear that the lecture had been called 
off. The police permit that had already been granted was 
withdrawn at the last minute. 
The organisers were told that the lecture would have to 
be "postponed'' because conditions in the city were "not 
yet stable". On the day of the lecture, the head of the 
Institute had been summoned by the pol ice to be told the 
lecture could go ahead, but he was surrrnoned later that 
day and questioned by an officer in charge of 
intelligence. He returned home from this second meeting, 
thinking the permit was still valid, but soon afterwards, 
he got a letter to say the whole thing was off. 
reforms. Present policies would lead to the elimination 
of the West Papuans as a people. Reforms would allow the 
West Papuans to express tl1f;!mselves and organise: . 
The long term struggle must be for self determination; 
the immediate struggle is to survive. The West Papuan 
struggle is a part of the worldwide fight back against 
colonialism. It takes place in the context of 
increasingly militant and art iculote struggles by 
indigenous peoples and minorities everywhere for the 
right to survive and to manage their own affairs. Jakarta 
must be brought to realise that these are rights which 
cannot be denied. 
Alan Smith 
of the regulation establishing this 'b.ersih lingkungan' 
criterion, though he did know that the'· regulation C)bou.t 
"clearance certificates" comes from General Murdani, 
commander of the army's security corrmon.9, Kopkamtib. 
Keep coopernt i ve boards clean of '1ex-PKI"! 
Bustanil Arifin, Minister for Cooperatives and head of 
the Logistics Board, Bulog, has instructed all 
cooperatives to make sure that no ."ex-PKl/G30S" ele111ents 
get elected onto the'ir management boards. He informed a 
duly shocked audience that a small cooperative in Bandung 
had appointed an "ex-PKI element" as financial manager. 
He said all cooperative offices at all levels are bein'g 
instructed to examine management boards throughout the 
cooperative movement to ''keep them dean" [Kompas, 17 
February]. 
Banned seanen's union meni>ers f h;st to be dismissed 
Plans to rationalise the labour force in Surabaya's 
harbour by preventing shipping companies from handling 
loading and unloading will result in large-scale 
redundancies by the former. When asked whether reports of 
mass dismissals were true, a harbour official said, "Not 
at all!" People losing employment i.n shipping companies 
will all be absorbed .by freight companies, he said, all, 
that is, except former members of the seamen's union, the 
SBPP [banned in 1965]. They would be sacked [Suaro 
Merdeka, 13 March]. 
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